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中国人你为什么不生气|八部半
【费里尼曰】
“起来!不愿做奴隶的人们!把我们的血肉,筑成我们新的长城!中华民族到了最危险的时候,每个人被迫着发出最后的吼声。起来!起来!!起来!!!我们万众一心,冒着敌人的炮火,前进!冒着敌人的炮火,前进!前进!前进进!”
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【费里尼曰】
網友指出《我的中國芯》細節多處不合理,「把半導體晶片從業者和觀眾智商按在地上摩擦」。(圖片來源/翻攝自微博)
中國網路電視劇《我的中國芯》結合浪漫、科研、愛國情操元素,原定7月10日歡樂上映,講述一家科技新創公司如何殺出西方制裁的重圍,開發先進晶片的「勵志」故事
穿越劇、科幻片、低級紅高級黑
沒想到,官方微博當日宣佈暫緩播出,突然喊卡的原因應該是負評太多了,中國網路酸民嘲笑該劇是穿越劇、科幻片、低級紅高級黑。
《彭博》報導指出,《我的中國芯片》原定上周一在阿里巴巴旗下的串流平台「優酷」首映,它談到北京政府的優先議題:半導體領先能力和自給自足,劇情描述一家國家支持的公司成功研製用於193奈米深紫外(DUV)光刻機的雷射器。
美中貿易戰升級,導致荷蘭晶片設備巨頭ASML最好的EUV和次好的光刻機DUV設備都被禁止賣給中國,在美國、日本、荷蘭廠商聯合封鎖的背景下,《我的中國芯片》應運而生,劇情敘述一家中國公司克服重重挑戰並取得成功的「勵志」。
ASML同意DUV即將不能賣給中國
預告片開頭是一行英文字開頭:「我們正在對中國政府發動一場光刻機貿易戰。」偶像劇標題也可以理解為同音字「我的中國心」,它的英文名稱是《The Best Chip》。
美國前總統川普政府向荷蘭政府施壓,要求ASML從2020年初禁售EUV光刻機(又稱為曝光機)給中國,ASML2年多來無法向中國出售其最強大的機台EUV光刻機。
6月底,荷蘭和美國達成協議,將禁止ASML銷售第二先進設備DUV的幾款機台給中國,從而影響中國晶片商,DUV光刻機製造的晶片用於智慧手機、電動汽車等各種產品。
新款雷射器可以造出先進晶片?
正因為DUV如此重要,才會有中國導演拍出《我的中國芯》,該網路劇講述一家民營科技公司承接北京的重大科研項目,研發用於光刻機的193奈米DUV雷射器。
只要安裝這種雷射器的光刻機,就可以解決絕大多數先進晶片的生產問題,如果研發成功,對國家具有重大意義。但在研發關鍵時刻,老闆在外國被扣留,老闆娘甚至抵押了自己的別墅,該公司也陷入資金短缺危機。最終在研發總監的帶領下,該公司同心合力,排除萬難,成功克服諸多技術難關。
另一版預告片是「黃總在國外被扣留了」、「估計是我們科研項目比較敏感吧!」該劇還引用一段英文旁白:「即日起,全面禁止向中國銷售先進光刻機」,這些都是呼應美中科技戰,並且把現實中,美日荷6月底聯手限制晶片出口作為故事背景。
惡意諷刺中國晶片現狀
根據介紹,「我的中國芯」由李克執導,呂小芳、林姍、帥贇編劇,顧佑明、何澤遠、姚凱辰、周蓉倩、張藍藝、郭祥、民浩、張傲等主演。
該劇宣傳片出爐後,有網民認為可以鼓勵不少科研人員,「終於有電視劇關注到中國的科研之路了,希望能好好講述中國晶片勵志故事」、「在美國限制晶片下,大家要多多支持」。
但是也有網友開玩笑說,「哪壺不開提哪壺?」,還有網友吐槽,「一看就是打著晶片的噱頭談戀愛」,「193納米(奈米)???」「是科幻片」、「無比尷尬」「看這些劇不尷尬嗎?」「真的太土了,給晶片業的人多點尊重吧」,還有網民痛批「這是低級紅高級黑,惡意諷刺中國晶片現狀」。
第2季中國客戶瘋搶ASML的DUV
還有細心的網友指出,細節疑有多處不合理,「把半導體晶片從業者和觀眾智商按在地上摩擦」,像是劇中描寫的「實驗室起火」等情節不合常識,「光刻(曝光)的條件大部分是抽真空,怎麼可能會爆炸啊?」。
一如網民毒舌批評:就像中國護照,現實很骨感。中國客戶搶貨,帶動ASML第二季DUV銷量意外大幅增長,「別人不要的都被中國買走了」,讓ASML的業績保持強勁成長,也促使中國市場在DUV光刻機佔比較第1季大增2倍,
ASML近日公布第2季度財報顯示,淨銷售額為69億歐元,年比增長27%,季比增長2%,接近65至70億歐元預估區間的上限。
image: joao fazendaAt some point the ill-explained, weeks-long disappearance of China's foreign minister, Qin Gang, will come to an end. Quite possibly Mr Qin—a suavely confident diplomat of the iron-fist and velvet-glove type, rocket-propelled to high office by a spell as an aide to President Xi Jinping—will quietly resume his duties, just as suddenly as he stopped work after a day of meetings on June 25th. Perhaps he will explain the undefined health issues that remain the only official reason for his absence. Still, it cannot be excluded that Mr Qin's career path is about to take a grimmer turn. That would vindicate Beijing's elite gossip mill, which is currently seething with ever-wilder theories about Mr Qin, some of them worthy of a bad romantic novel or spy thriller.
However this episode ends, it is a reminder that China's capital, for all its Tesla showrooms and Apple stores and outward marks of globalised modernity, remains a tough place. It is a city of secrets and rumours. Grandees do sometimes vanish, before reappearing to face charges of corruption, immorality or dissent. In an age when other countries' leaders drop indiscretions on social media or in interviews, China's ruling classes heed codes of silence that would be familiar to Communist Party cadres of the 1950s. As Beijing is pounded by a heatwave, Chinese elites and foreign ambassadors huddle in embassy gardens and drawing rooms to exchange theories about Mr Qin. Diplomats compare notes about when the foreign minister's meetings first began to be cancelled, and how far ahead, looking for evidence of a sudden, severe health crisis. Analysts scour China's tightly policed internet for signs of censors deleting comments about Mr Qin, or about an alleged friend with a boastful, indiscreet presence on social media. According to the brutal rules of Chinese politics, it would be a bad sign if Mr Qin were becoming a non-person. But a lack of censorship might also signal that powerful allies are deserting him.
Even with the mystery unresolved, a few lessons may be drawn about how power is wielded in China. Some are simple. If Mr Qin really is unwell, a formal statement about his health would help calm the rumour mills. But physical infirmity is a political taboo. This goes beyond a preference for privacy. Leaders are expected to be vigorous. Any sign of frailty is risky: party gatherings are a sea of dyed black hair. While China's strict zero-covid rules were in force, no senior official admitted to catching the virus.
Other lessons about Chinese power are less simple. Take Mr Qin's job as foreign minister. That is one reason why his disappearance matters, but not the most significant. Chinese job titles map poorly onto those used elsewhere. Foreign ministers are outranked by the head of the party's Foreign Affairs Commission: a post held by Wang Yi, who is China's top diplomat. More importantly, when Chinese insiders assess an office-holder's clout, they look at not just that one individual but all his or her patrons and allies and even family members, as if connections can be glimpsed like a spectral halo of influence. In Mr Qin's case, his absence is a big deal because he is seen as Mr Xi's protégé. Provoking envy as he rose, Mr Qin was fast-tracked to ministerial rank and into the party's central committee in 2022, not long after being made a vice-foreign minister and ambassador to Washington. In Beijing, that ascension is linked to Mr Qin's stint as head of diplomatic protocol from 2014 to 2017, which involved lots of contact with Mr Xi.
As a result, Mr Qin's rapid rise should offer clues about Mr Xi's worldview, or at least about the sort of diplomacy that he values. The foreign minister is sometimes called a "wolf warrior", but that is misleading. Some Chinese diplomats deserve that tag, which comes from a jingoistic Chinese action film. Truly wolfish envoys are often crudely anti-Western. They repeat conspiracy theories about alleged American misdeeds, harvested from shady corners of the internet or from Russian disinformation agencies.
In encounters with foreigners, Mr Qin shows deep knowledge of the Western world, gained during several postings abroad. That familiarity appears to co-exist with disdain for a West seen as declining, arrogant and hypocritical. Indeed, some claim that Mr Qin reserves a special scorn for Western reporters, dating back to his first job out of university, as a government-supplied researcher for an American news agency in Beijing. Still, his absence is a source of regret on the capital's diplomatic circuit. In Mr Xi's China, the black box of elite politics is only getting more opaque. When clever, candid officials vanish, they are missed.