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2015-04-30

秦晖:谁是中国真正的朋友和敌人

秦晖:谁是中国真正的朋友和敌人

2015-04-01

我讲两个最极端的例子,大家知道东南亚地区这两三百年经常排华,但是东南亚国家中基本上没有发生过排华事件的国家,也就是对华人 最好的国家是哪个国家呢?大家可能都知道应该是泰国。历史上东南亚这些国家几乎都发生过大规模排华事件,就是泰国没有发生过。可是泰国在东南亚这些国家 中,70年代曾经我们认为是最坏的国家,那个时候官方对泰国的说法是美国等反动统治集团统治的国家,而且我们当时支持泰国共产党在他们那里搞革命,我们的 昆明曾经设过泰国共产党的电台,在那里天天骂泰国,而且骂得很厉害。那个时候越南跟我们的关系就好很多,可是越南对华侨、对华人、对华商都很坏,基本上是 对他们实行剥夺政策的。而且老实说,这个剥夺政策也不是1978年中国和越南翻脸了以后才有的,在这之前就已经剥夺了,可那个时候中国跟越南的官方关系还 是很不错的。但是越南并不是最坏的,那个时候最坏的是……


听众:印度尼西亚。


秦 晖:不是印度尼西亚,老实说印度尼西亚是不是比越南更坏都是一个问题,但是毫无疑问,比越南和印度尼西亚要坏得多的是柬埔寨的.红色高棉.。柬埔寨的红色 高棉对华人已经不是剥夺的问题了。红色高棉统治柬埔寨只有三年多的时间,但是华人人口下降了三分之二,死了三分之二。红色高棉屠杀华人,不光是屠杀所谓的 富有的华人,甚至连侨共也杀。什么是侨共呢?就是华侨中的共产党,当时不属于红色高棉,而是属于中共系统的。侨共在红色高棉时期几乎全部被杀光,死亡率比 一般华侨还要大。但是大家知道那个时候红色高棉是我们中国的铁哥们,为了红色高棉,我们不仅敢得罪泰国,也敢得罪越南。为了拯救红色高棉,我们跟越南打了 一仗。也就是说对华人最坏的国家,我们认为是最友好的国家,对华人最好的国家我们认为是最敌对的国家。


现 在其实也是一样,比如说在工业化国家中,我们知道如果要说对华人、华侨、华商最开放、最友好的国家,其实大家都知道不管喜不喜欢,这是一个事实,毫无疑问 就是美国。哪怕就是民主国家,像欧洲,对华人当然也不能说坏,但是老实说在欧洲华人要像美国那样的融入主流社会仍然是不可能的。欧洲的华人不可能像美国那 样,很多人成为高官,很多人成为教授,很多人成为大科学家,进入主流社会。欧洲的华人基本说只能做两件事,一件事就是开餐馆,一件就是做皮鞋那种手工作 坊,别的事情很难做。我们的很多朋友都是在欧洲获得了学位,他们的导师在学术界有很高的评价,但是他们要在大学中谋职是非常非常困难的,要比美国困难得 多。


但 是欧洲毫无疑问也不是最差的,俄罗斯要比西欧对华人、华侨、华商糟得太多,现在中俄关系很密切,到过俄罗斯的人很多,他们是怎么对待华人的?当然了,其实 华人自己也有很多毛病,这个我们应该承认,包括坑蒙拐骗、假冒伪劣,但是这些东西西欧的华人也有,西欧却为什么没有这样对付华人?包括去年发生的那个.新 星号事件.就不是虐待华人的问题,还公开打死了几个华人海员,像这样的事情在其他工业化的国家中都不可能发生。但是现在又是俄罗斯跟我们关系最好,欧洲次 之,美国是我们的敌人。我觉得有一个很大的问题,就是我们现在的外交,只要你拍.皇上.的马屁就是友好国家,哪怕把我们的公民、我们的同胞杀得再多还是友 好国家。假如你不讨我们.皇上.的喜欢就是敌对国家,哪怕对我们的同胞再友好都没用,我觉得这样的外交是很奇怪的。如果这样,我们国家所谓的.再崛起.对 一般的国民是没有什么好处的。可以想像,如果我们国家进一步崛起了,像那种现在和我们友好的那些国家越来越多,比如说和我们友好的国家有缅甸等,那些国家 如果多起来,还有我们中国人的活路吗?


我 前不久去了一趟东南亚,有人告诉我一件事。大家知道缅甸也是我们的铁哥们,因为它跟西方不好,就跟我们很好。我们在缅甸搞了一座桥,我方建议要把它命名 为.缅中友谊大桥.,但缅甸军政府不同意,要把它命名为他们将军的一个名字,我印象中好像叫金友大桥(音)(注:我没找到这座桥)。当时中方也就同意了, 但是这个大桥落成之后给当地华人社区发了邀请,结果大桥落成的时候这些人都不来,为什么呢?后来一了解才知道,原来那个将军就是在 1964年缅甸排华的时候屠杀华人的罪魁祸首,当地的华人对他痛恨得不得了,但就是这样的人是友好人士.。所以我觉得所谓"中国人民站起来了"这句话该怎 么理解?在缅甸这样的国家中国人站起来了吗?这的确是一个很有意思的现象。


我 不想涉及那么敏感的问题,我只是说就算我们把这些问题——也就是国家的地位到底是皇上的地位还是国民的地位——先放在一边,仅仅就一般意义上的国家权益而 言,1949年这场变化到底带来了什么改变?所谓"中国人民站起来了",我就不说公民权利了,我只说所谓的主权,——至于人权和主权谁大,我姑且不说。那 么1949年以后中国国家权益,或者说所谓的主权,到底有哪些增进?哪一个不平等条约是1949年废除的?哪一块领土是1949年收复的?哪一点经济权 益,包括海关权益,各种权益在内是1949年获得的?不管是大的还是小的。我相信没有一个人能够回答出来!的确是找不到!


我 们都知道近代中国损失了很多国家权益,包括不平等条约,租界、外国在华特权,包括领土的丧失。为了改变这一点,中国人付出了极大的努力,而且也取得了很大 的进步。但是平心而论,绝大部分的进步都发生在1949年以前。1949年以后也取得了进步,比如说收回香港和澳门,但是与1949 年本身有很远的距离。我觉得1949年以后中国国家权益的收复,平心而论最早的一个进步应该是在1954年,斯大林死了以后,赫鲁晓夫上来,他的地位比较 脆弱,他当时对中国是最友好的。不过我这里要讲,对中国最友好的人往往都不得好报,这个人后来就成为被中国骂得很厉害的人。是赫鲁晓夫把斯大林从中国夺走 了的那些东西都还给了中国,像旅顺、大连和新疆的很多所谓的苏资公司,这些都是1954年以后赫鲁晓夫归还给中国的。但是在这之前,从1949年到 1954年,我相信没有一个人能提出中国的国家权益在这五年中有什么增进。中国的国家权益的恢复是一个比较漫长的过程,我前面有一段话,虽然大家都说 1949年的革命变化很大,的确这个革命是在国共两党之间进行的一场斗争,国共两党的确有很多不同,这应该承认。但是我前面曾经提到,国共两党的不同,与 国共两党和中国其他势力的不同相比,应该是要小得多。我们以前经常把国共两党之外的那些势力叫作中间势力,或者叫作第三势力。


推荐阅读"秦晖金雁文集"


出境游客拖累中国软实力?

2015年04月29日 06:41 AM
出境游客拖累中国软实力?

北京方面在建立亚洲基础设施投资银行(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,简称亚投行)问题上让华盛顿蒙羞,可能使2015年成为全球经济权力平衡显著倒向中国的时刻而被载入史册。

但现实是,全球经济秩序的结构变化很少引起普通人的注意。而全球旅游秩序的结构变化却并非如此:我们都关心如今哪些人在成群结队地游览金字塔或卢浮 宫。中国推动自己的民众排队购买百老汇(Broadway)门票的能力,远比其在亚洲基础设施融资方面发号施令的能力更令我们大多数人担忧。

而奇怪的是,北京方面对此却是最为关心的。内地游客是中国全球软实力攻势的一个重要部分;如果他们在国外丢脸,那国家形象也会受损。因此,中国政府已经采取措施,旨在促使内地游客规范自己的旅游行为。

中国国家主席习近平去年访问马尔代夫时说:"要教育我们的公民到海外旅游讲文明。矿泉水瓶子不要乱扔,不要去破坏人家的珊瑚礁。"

当然,只是到了近期,人们才不得不担心中国人的矿泉水瓶。直到世纪之交,普通中国公民出境旅游仍然受到严格限制。自那以后,出国旅游增长了10倍,使中国成为世界最大的国际旅行消费国。去年,中国出境游总计达1.17亿人次。

随着出境人数的增多,有关不文明行为的媒体报道也多了起来。仅在过去几个月,中文报纸就报道了:内地游客用开水烫伤了一位亚洲航空 (AirAsia)的空姐,起因是针对座位分配以及他们是否要为泡方便面的开水付费发生争执;四名中年妇女因恼于小孩哭闹而在飞行途中大打出手;几名女性 乘客之间爆发了一场撕扯头发的互殴,起因是一个历来非常伤脑筋的问题,即文明人应该被允许将座椅靠背向后倾斜到何种程度;以及多个反复上演的场景——旅客 为了"呼吸新鲜空气"而强行打开飞机的紧急逃生舱门。

还有旅客坚持行使逃脱安检这一不可剥夺的权利。而在北京方面看来,最糟糕的旅游新闻头条是2013年一名中国少年在卢克索神庙的涂鸦事件:一个本应通晓事理的古老文明对另一个古老文明的侮辱。

中国旅游研究院(China Tourism Academy)院长戴斌指出,"航班无名火"并不仅限于中国人。而且,由于中国有更多游客,在航班上自然就会发生更多不愉快。中国的出境游仍处于起步阶段。改变需要时间。

中国政府的一项新要求是:具有一定规模(未明确)的旅游团要包括一名"综合素质好的游客"来督导其他成员的行为。一则官方评论称,"文明督导员必须 掌握一些理论来劝导其他游客",而且"要有勇气指出其他人出现的不文明行为,并帮助他们改正(那些行为)"。对此,我们只能说,祝好运。

北京方面的管制手段可能是全世界最严格的,但普通中国民众似乎非常不善于服从命令。他们从未停止让我感到惊讶,例如,在中国有多少假装失聪的飞机乘 客?他们能够听到有什么吃的可选,却听不到关闭手机或是抬高自己座椅靠背的指令。有一份报纸认为,彼此熟识的游客可能会服从文明督导员,而对于那些互不相 识的游客,可能需要给他们提供旅游折扣以鼓励他们举止得体。

这一定足以让一位独裁者痛哭:如果你无法阻止中年妇女在经济舱里相互撕扯对方的头发,那威权主义还有什么意义呢?不过,作为曾是世界上最不受欢迎的 旅游"王朝"——丑陋美国人的美国——的公民,我想说:不论在亚投行还是在洲际事务中,要习惯成为重量级人物都需要时间。但没人比中国人学得更快:他们会 马上将手伸向垃圾回收箱,并为保护珊瑚礁而展开激战。

译者/陈隆祥

靠教育有用吗?生活在自由平等文明社会的人们自然也会谦逊文明,反之大家都懂得,常言道,一方水土养一方人。中共国有软实力吗?

FT社评:美国种族问题依然难解


2015年04月29日 13:18 PM
FT社评:美国种族问题依然难解

不久之前,美国曾相信自己已经攻克了暴力犯罪这种流行病。"零容忍"和"三振出局"是美国社会上世纪90年代反复重申的信条,其结果是凶杀率下降。如今,信条已失效。在巴尔的摩,又一名手无寸铁的黑人男性在被警察局拘留期间死亡,之后爆发的骚乱正愈演愈烈。

美国有230万人在监狱,"零容忍"政策产生了全世界最大的囚犯人口。美国的监狱比威权制度下的中国还要满,而中国人口是美国的4倍多。这一政策还 让上世纪60年代民权运动时代取得的部分进步付之东流。数万名黑人男性因为微小的过错坐牢,而犯同样过错的白人男性受到的责罚不会比打手心重多少。美国选 出了首位黑人总统也说明不了什么。一代黑人认为自己背负着烙印,他们的不满无人理会。如马丁•路德•金(Martin Luther King) 1968年遇刺前所说:"暴动是不被倾听者的语言(A riot is the language of the unheard)。"

然而黑暗中的一抹亮色是,有迹象显示,美国政界已开始应对这个巨大的难题。比尔•克林顿(Bill Clinton)担任总统时曾是上世纪90年代刑罚改革的主要推动者。最近他承认,当时的做法"过头了"。在他担任总统的那个年代,任何一位政界人士如被 视为"对犯罪心慈手软",都难以承担这带来的政治后果。如今,两党都认同需要减少美国囚犯人数、给那些有过犯罪记录的人更公平的重新做人的机会。

这是一个积极的变化。美国警方的悄然军事化不仅未能让凶杀率持续下降,反而制造了一种逍遥法外的文化,导致每年有数百名手无寸铁的平民被枪杀。只有 一小部分涉事者被要求承担责任。难怪,从密苏里州的弗格森到马里兰州的巴尔的摩,很多地方的人们与本应保护他们的警察产生隔阂。难怪,许多黑人男性觉得自 己被排除在社会给予其他人的机会之外。问题是:该怎么办?

最重要的是承认挑战的复杂性。继去年夏天18岁、手无寸铁的迈克尔•布朗(Michael Brown)在弗格森遭枪杀后,巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)成立了"21世纪警务工作特别小组"(Task Force on 21st Century Policing)。这个小组的建议值得称赞,但缺乏实际价值。它的报告聚焦于如何重建警察和社区之间的信任。一些其他团体则认为应强制警察巡逻时佩戴随 身摄像机。

更令人鼓舞的是全面改革美国刑罚制度的建议。美国的毒品法实际上起了反作用。在美国的部分地区,白人青年现在可以合法吸食大麻,而在其他地区,黑人 青年仅仅拥有大麻就会面临终身监禁。美国半数州所采取的"三振出局法"也是如此。有关强制判决的一些数据清楚显示它存在种族偏见,因此必须终结。非暴力罪 犯也应能清除他们的犯罪记录。好在这里也有希望的曙光。极端保守的科赫(Koch)兄弟最近加入了"禁止查问"(ban the box)运动,该运动倡导雇主不询问求职者的犯罪记录,直到进入后期的面试程序。

再就是领导人的问题。出于可理解的原因,奥巴马对美国黑人青年的异化程度一直保持沉默。但现在他已经没什么好损失的。20世纪50年代和60年代, 美国富有感召力的领导人将一代可能会走向激进主义的年轻人引向更具建设性的抗议。现在能办到这一点的人只有奥巴马。在历任美国总统中,他最不该留下让种族 冲突继续发酵的政治遗产。

译者/何黎


2015年04月29日 06:41 AM
奥巴马:巴尔的摩骚乱是"发酵的危机"

美国总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)感叹美国"缓慢发酵的危机"。在巴尔的摩发生自1968年马丁•路德•金(Martin Luther King)遇刺以来最严重的骚乱之后,国民警卫队(National Guard)官兵被部署到这个港口城市的街头巷尾,市民们开始清理。

25岁的黑人弗雷迪•格雷(Freddie Gray)在被警方羁押期间,由于至今无法解释的脊椎损伤而丧生。周一晚上,在他的葬礼之后,巴尔的摩爆发了严重暴力活动。事件发生后,奥巴马呼吁改革美 国各地的警察局,并对其进行重新训练。他还倡议发起整体努力,通过教育、就业培训和基础设施投资为贫困社区带来更多机遇。

在昨日白宫举行的记者会上,奥巴马表示:"这是一场已持续一段时间的缓慢发酵的危机,不是什么新情况。"

奥巴马提到密苏里州弗格森市警方射杀一名黑人少年后引发的激烈抗议。他说:"自弗格森事件以来,我们已看到太多似乎是警方妨碍个人的案子,而这些个人往往是非裔美国人和穷人。这种事几乎每周都会发生。"

他说,骚乱是"少数犯罪分子和暴徒"挑起的,这些人"需要被当作犯罪分子对待"。在巴尔的摩,警方的直升机在空中盘旋之际,市民们加入了携带清洁器材的志愿者的行列,大家都希望帮助该市西部蒙道敏区(Mondawmin)从周一爆发的暴力活动中恢复过来。

与姐妹一道来提供支持的辛西娅•斯旺(Cynthia Swann)表示:"昨天我哭了一整天。"

斯旺女士强调,她并不宽容暴力行为。但她补充说,骚乱分子所发泄的不满情绪,整个社区都能感觉到,其原因是她所称的当地警方频繁的苛待。

格雷死后,6名警员已被停职,司法部正展开调查。斯旺表示:"多年来,西区警察一直把这个社区踩在脚下。"她还补充说,居高不下的失业率加剧了紧张局面。

智库——司法政策研究所(Justice Policy Institute)表示,蒙道敏区45%的劳动年龄人口没有工作。同时,长期高企的高中逃课率目前为33%左右。

现年29岁、从小认识格雷的纳撒尼尔•爱德华兹(Nathaniel Edwards)表示:"他们会坚持到正义得到伸张为止。"

马里兰州已宣布进入紧急状态。州长拉里•霍根(Larry Hogan)表示,5000名国民警卫队官兵及另外5000名来自其他州的警察已被调往巴尔的摩。

译者/简易

万达的生意经 Chinese Power Player Places Risky Bet on Moviegoing (本文最初发表于2012年5月25日)

2012年06月26日

万达的生意经

DAVID BARBOZA

北京——因为北美电影市场的不景气,好莱坞的电影公司对中国表现出了更大兴趣。

沃尔特‧迪斯尼公司(Walt Disney Company)及其子公司漫威娱乐(Marvel Entertainment)旗下的曼威工作室(Marvel Studios)正在中国制作《钢铁侠3》(Iron Man 3);新闻集团(News Corporation)近期入股北京的博纳影业集团;同中国有关部门达成的一项协议将允许更多美国公司发行更多电影,美国片方还将从中国这个世界增长最 快的经济体中获得更多的票房分账。

不过,至少有一位商界的亿万富豪押注美国电影市场,认为那里依旧是通向国际成功的入场券。他是位中国人。

王健林是位白手起家的大亨,如今正收购AMC娱乐(AMC Entertainment),这是仅次于帝高娱乐(Regal Entertainment)的北美第二大院线。他承诺要将AMC整合到一个新的、中国制造的全球品牌中,这一品牌叫万达集团。

王健林现年57岁,被视作中国最成功的房地产巨头之一。他旗下170亿美元的帝国涵盖巨型商业地产开发项目、五星级酒店、度假村、一家影视制作公司,以及亚洲最大的电影院线。

现在,万达斥资26亿美元收购AMC,藉此在全球拓展其势力范围。此项交易于周日公布,尚有待美国监管当局批准,但无迹象表明交易可能受阻。 本次收购昭示王健林个人的新纪元,亦彰显中国的发展进入一个新时代。中国企业正走出低端制造业,进军海外以寻求自然资源与全球消费品牌,这是中国经济升级 努力的一部分。

在北京宽敞的总部接受采访时,万达集团董事长王健林称,他正在斟酌自己的下一个海外目的地:欧洲。

"我们正在进行谈判,"王健林说。

万达是一家私营企业,在这个国家占主导地位的是国有企业。但AMC并购案同中国政府的优先目标紧密对接,这些目标包括:鼓励中国企业"走向全球";推进中国媒体和娱乐产业全面变革;更为重视居民消费。

北京的决策者也有意提升中国的"软实力",意图在国际上拓展其文化影响力,而电影产业被认为是达到此项目最富前景的途径之一。

但有24年历史的万达集团毕竟缺乏国际经验,在分析人士看来,它能否使如此规模的并购案获得成功,并创建一个全球房地产与娱乐品牌,仍是未定之数。

"中国拥有出色的企业家。但问题是:他们将如何带领企业走向国际?他们愿意学习并做出改变吗?"博达克咨询有限公司(BDA China)——一家位于北京的投资顾问公司——董事长邓肯‧克拉克(Duncan Clark)指出。

这一领域最大的试验之一,正由王健林实施。他出身行伍,将一家小小的房地产公司发展为一个全国性品牌。万达起家于大连,后将其总部迁入北京万达广场,旗下开发或运营的物业总面积高达1.83亿平方英尺。

王健林15岁初中毕业后从军,据他自称,1988年,他辞去大连地方政府官员的职位,借来8万美元创办了一家企业;现在,他称自己的企业是一头"飞奔的大象"。

中国商业地产联盟创办人王永平称,王健林总是能比中国其他房地产巨头们先行一步。

"他有远见,"王永平说(王永平同王健林无亲属关系):"大家都盯着住宅市场时,他跳出来专注商业地产;大家都追捧商业地产时,他的目光转向文化和旅游产业,这些产业是政府目前正在强调和培育的。"

虽然很少有中国企业成功建立全球品牌,王健林对此却并不担心。在他看来,投资于一家专注于"看电影"这种地道的美国式体验的公司,似乎没什么好害怕的;毕竟他经历过文化大革命,那段时期中国的社会与政治均陷于疯狂之中。

"在制定目标和执行战略方面,万达是成熟的,"王健林说:"我们拥有完善的体系和部门。如果目标没有达到,黄灯就会亮起来。"

王健林称,通常都能达到目标。去年,尽管市场处在下行中,公司仍获得30%的增长。而且,他说到2030年,公司营业总收入将达到300亿美元。

这就让人不解了:为什么在美国电影市场不佳,票房收入疲软,美国的电影制作人正将目光投向中国之际,还要来投资?

有分析人士暗示,王健林收购AMC有政治目的,旨在讨好中国领导人——他们希望通过文化产品出口推进中国的国际影响力。还有人称,王健林热衷于将自己树立为中国的第一位全球企业领导人。

一位熟悉万达-AMC谈判,但未获授权对此作出评论的公司高管称:"对他(王健林)来说,这是一个声明式的买卖:他要从中国走出去,这个领域他很有兴趣。他不断强调,要学习如何在美国运营影院。这不仅是为了钱。"

但为了做成这笔交易,万达需要很多钱:超过30亿美金现金,包括承诺在北美投资于AMC的5亿美元。眼下信贷环境艰难,中国房地产市场又处于下跌中,筹到如此巨额金钱实非易事。最终,这笔现金将主要来自中国的国有大型银行。

为确保交易成功,王健林称,他将以长期薪酬激励保留AMC的管理层不变,并大量投资翻新老旧美国影院,以提高营业收入。

当被问及AMC是否会放映中国政府不喜欢的影片时(比如反映西藏叛乱的争议作品),王健林称,他不会干涉美国的管理团队所作的决策。

对于中国国内有人认为王健林同失势的政治局委员薄熙来的关系可能会给万达造成伤害(薄熙来也起家于大连),他做出了反驳。

"我们认识,彼此非常熟悉。但仅限于工作关系,没有私交。"王健林说。据他称,政府并未要求调查万达集团。

整个采访过程中,王健林说话时冷静、沉重,偶尔捻一下拇指。他说自己专注于目标和战略执行,速度要快。

他说,收购一家好莱坞制片厂并不在他的计划中,但也不排除这种可能性。他又说,酒店和美国的购物中心是更有可能的目标。

"我们没有房地产走向全球的战略,"王健林说:"但为了全球化和走出去,我们有意收购酒店和酒店管理公司。我们也喜欢百货商店。"

Zhang Wei在北京、Gu Huini在上海为本文提供研究支持。

本文最初发表于2012年5月25日。

翻译:韩松

June 26, 2012

Chinese Power Player Places Risky Bet on Moviegoing

By DAVID BARBOZA

BEIJING — Hollywood studios, facing steep challenges in the North American movie market, are taking more interest in China.

The Walt Disney Company and Marvel Studios, a division of Disney's Marvel Entertainment subsidiary, are producing "Iron Man 3" in China. News Corporation recently bought a stake in the Bona Film Group in Beijing. And an agreement with Chinese authorities will allow more American companies to distribute more movies and reap a greater share of the box office in China, the world's fastest-growing economy.

But at least one billionaire businessman is betting that the American movie market is still the ticket to international success. And he is Chinese.

Wang Jianlin, a rags-to-riches tycoon, is taking over AMC Entertainment, North America's second-largest movie theater chain behind Regal Entertainment. And he is promising to integrate it into a new, made in China, global brand called the Wanda Group.

Mr. Wang, 57, is regarded as one of the most successful Chinese real estate tycoons. His $17 billion empire includes huge commercial property developments, five-star hotels, tourist resorts, a film and television production company and Asia's largest cinema network.

Now, by paying $2.6 billion to acquire AMC, the Wanda Group is extending its reach globally. The deal, announced Sunday, is still subject to the approval of United States regulators, though there are no hints it will be blocked. The purchase signifies a new era for Mr. Wang and in China's development. Companies here are moving away from low-cost manufacturing and going abroad in search of natural resources and global consumer brands, part of an effort to upgrade the nation's economy.

In an interview at his spacious headquarters in Beijing, Mr. Wang, the Wanda chairman, said he was pondering his next international destination: Europe.

"We're already negotiating," he said.

Wanda is a private company in a nation dominated by state-owned enterprises. But the AMC deal is closely aligned with the Chinese government's priorities, which include encouraging Chinese companies to "go global," pushing an overhaul of Chinese media and entertainment properties and placing greater emphasis on consumer spending.

Policy makers in Beijing also want to bolster China's "soft power" capabilities to extend its cultural influence internationally, and the film industry is considered one of the most promising avenues for doing so.

But whether Wanda, a 24-year-old enterprise with little international experience, can make a success of such a big acquisition and create a global property and entertainment brand is debatable, analysts say.

"China has great entrepreneurs," says Duncan Clark, chairman of BDA China, a Beijing-based investment advisory firm. "But the question is: How will they take these companies international? Are they going to be willing to learn and adapt?"

One of the biggest experiments in this area is being undertaken by Mr. Wang, a former army officer who has turned a tiny real estate venture into a national brand. Wanda, which started in Dalian, a northeastern city, and moved its headquarters to Wanda Plaza in Beijing, is a colossus with 183 million square feet of land under development or operation.

In 1988, Mr. Wang — who entered the army at 15, after middle school — says he left a job as a local government official in Dalian and borrowed $80,000 to start a business he now describes as a "sprinting elephant."

Wang Yongping, founder of the China Commercial Real Estate Association, described the chairman of Wanda as usually a step ahead of other Chinese real estate barons.

"He always has a vision," Mr. Wang, no relation, said. "When everybody was doing housing property, he jumped out to focus on commercial property. When everybody was chasing commercial property, he was eyeing culture and tourism — the industries that the government is stressing and cultivating."

That few Chinese companies have managed to establish global brands is of little concern to Wanda's chairman. And buying a stake in a company focused on a quintessentially American experience — moviegoing — seemed hardly daunting for a man who survived the Cultural Revolution, a period of social and political madness in China.

"In setting goals and executing a strategy, Wanda is sophisticated," said Mr. Wang, the Wanda chairman. "We have good systems and departments. If targets are not reached, a yellow light goes off."

Mr. Wang usually hits his targets, he says. The company has experienced 30 percent growth in the last year, even in a down market. And he promises that by 2015 the Wanda Group will have overall revenue of about $30 billion.

Which raises the question: Why invest in the United States cinema market at a time of weakness, when box office receipts are sluggish and American film producers are looking to China?

Some analysts have suggested that Mr. Wang's acquisition of AMC was political, an effort to curry favor with Chinese leaders, who are pushing their nation to enhance its influence by exporting cultural products. Others contend that Mr. Wang is eager to establish himself as China's first global corporate chief.

"This is kind of a statement deal for him," said an executive familiar with the Wanda-AMC talks, but not authorized to discuss them. "He's coming out of China, and this is an area he has great interest in. He kept emphasizing he just wants to learn how cinemas are operated in the U.S. It's not just about the money."

But to pull off the deal, Wanda needed plenty of that: more than $3 billion in cash, including $500 million it has promised to invest in AMC in North America. Financing such a big deal in a tough credit environment, and with China's property market in a slump, was some feat. In the end, much of the cash came from China's big, state-controlled banks.

To ensure that the deal succeeds, Mr. Wang said he would keep AMC's management in place with long-term pay incentives, and invest heavily in renovating older American theaters in an effort to bolster revenue.

Asked whether AMC would show films that the Chinese government found offensive, such as one dealing with the contentious issue of rebellions in Tibet, Mr. Wang said he would not interfere with decisions by his management team in the United States.

He also dismissed speculation in China that his ties to Bo Xilai, the fallen Politburo leader who also got his start in Dalian, could harm the Wanda Group.

"We knew each other, and were very familiar with one another," he said. "But it was just a working relationship. There was no personal relationship." He said the government had not asked to investigate the group.

Throughout the interview, Mr. Wang — who spoke calmly and quietly, and occasionally twirled his thumbs — said he was focusing on targets and executing strategies, fast.

Buying a Hollywood movie studio was not planned, he said, but he would not rule it out. Hotels and American shopping malls are more likely targets, he said.

"We don't have the strategy to go global in real estate," he said. "But for globalization and going out, we would like to buy hotels and hotel management companies. We also like department stores."

Zhang Wei contributed research from Beijing and Gu Huini from Shanghai.



Wanda is paying $2.6 billion for AMC Entertainment, including this theater in Los Angeles, to extend its reach globally. Credit Frederic J. Brown/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

万达帝国王健林:游刃于商业与权贵之间 Wang Jianlin, a Billionaire at the Intersection of Business and Power in China

2015年04月28日

万达帝国王健林:游刃于商业与权贵之间

傅才德

香港——他在全世界控制着成千上万的银幕,服务的电影观众比其他任何一家院线都多。他在四个大洲向房地产项目投入巨额资金。他正在修建的摩天大楼将会重绘伦敦和芝加哥的天际线。他也在计划收购一家好莱坞的电影制片厂。

在中国,身家过10亿美元的富豪多达430人,比美国以外的其他任何国家都多。但是王健林与众不同,原因不仅在于他是亚洲最富有的人,他的财富据估算超过350亿美元。

随着他的房地产和娱乐帝国向海外延伸,现年60岁的王健林凭借他在全球许多产业和社区的影响力,也成了中国私营部门并不多见的一位有能力在海外推进官方利益的大亨。

总理曾向他发函致谢,好莱坞最大的明星会听他的召唤,来到中国。今年3月,在一场吸引外国投资者的活动上,他是十几位与奥巴马总统晤面的商人中的一个。

父亲是毛泽东麾下参加共产主义革命的马前卒,儿子却一跃成为全球的顶级精英,这是中国向资本主义转型的过程中一个极为典型的故事。这场转变向 有才能或者有关系的人提供了极大机遇,而王健林可以说是既有才能,又有关系。不过,他的故事也是独一无二的:在一个所有土地都归政府所有的国家里,他建起 了全世界最有价值的房地产资产组合之一。

关于他的成就,《纽约时报》开展了长达一年的调查。调查揭示了在中国经济的顶峰,商业和权力鲜为人知地交汇在一起。在那里,共产党领导人的一时兴起,就能左右市场竞争的格局。

在过去超过30年的时间里,企业家推动了中国飞速的经济增长。然而在中国,即使是最成功的商人,也仍然需要与党达成某种合作——仅仅在一代人以前,党还在掌控着一个社会主义的计划经济社会。

王健林表示,他之所以能发迹,是因为向雄心勃勃的党内官员提供了他们想要的东西:作为样板工程的房地产开发项目。这些项目既能推动经济发展,又能推动官员的事业。他说,作为回报,官员则愿意以优惠价格把关键地块的开发权卖给王健林,远低于竞争对手需要支付的价钱。

他的企业集团万达,在中国最为著名的项目是标志性的万达广场。这些宏大的购物广场项目里,有影院、写字楼、宾馆和公寓。自从2002年在东北 城市长春兴建第一座万达广场以来,他已经在中国另外70座城市修建了超过100座。这些项目产生的收益如今为他向海外扩张的雄心提供了资金支持。

然而王健林与政府的关系当中,有一个方面他从未在采访中提及,在中国国内和国外对他成功故事的叙述中,这方面也从没有得到报道:中国最有权势的一些政治人物的亲属,以及他们的商业伙伴,在万达集团持有相当部分的股份。

通过仔细查阅公司向政府机关提交的文件,时报发现在2007年至2011年之间,有过数宗这样的投资。那时万达还未上市,极少向外界出售股份。

早期获得机会买到该公司股份的人当中,有一位是齐桥桥。她是一位活跃的投资者,也是中国现任国家主席习近平的姐姐。(2013年10月,她已经将持有的万达股份出售或转让给了一位长期的商业伙伴。)

通过查阅文件记录,采访家庭成员和商业伙伴,时报得知其他的早期投资者包括前总理温家宝女儿的一个商业伙伴,以及时任政治局委员贾庆林和王兆国的亲属。

去年12月,当王健林名下负责房地产业务的大连万达商业地产股份有限公司在香港首次公开发行时,他们在该地产公司的股份总价值11亿美元。而 在王健林负责电影业务的子公司今年1月单独上市时,他们在该电影院线所持股份价值1720万美元。目前,他们在两家公司持有的股份总价值逾15亿美元。

没有迹象表明,在亲属及生意伙伴拥有万达股份的相关政界人物中,有任何人代表该公司干预了与政府进行的任何交易。也没有证据表明,前述政界人 物中有任何人自身从这些投资者的巨额利润中获利。这些投资者以及政府官员或是没有回应书面提出的采访问题,或是无法联系到本人进行置评。

王健林拒绝了采访请求,也未回复提交给万达及代表万达的公关公司的书面问题。但在公开发言中,他经常用同一句话来描述自己是如何处理与当局的关系的:"亲近政府、远离政治。"

"实际上,就说中国经济是政府主导型经济,而且房地产又是一个审批型为主的行业,"王健林今年2月接受官方电视台的采访时说。"所以你要说这个行业我不理政府,完全做不到,我觉得完全就是一种虚话和假话。……但是同时,比方说,[我们]不行贿。"

商海弄潮 一帆风顺

2012年9月,一位不同寻常的演讲者让哈佛大学(Harvard)肯尼迪政府学院(John F. Kennedy School of Government)的学生着了迷。他个头不高,言辞直率,两眼间距不大,发际线呈明显的V字型。

"在中国尤其是民营企业能成功做大太不容易了,"他通过翻译说,"比美国企业家要艰辛好多倍。" 

如果教职人员这么说,就算不上什么不同凡响的洞见。但那天下午的演讲人是王健林,而且尽管存在他所说的困难,他依然在连战连捷。

在发表演讲的几个月前,王健林收购了美国第二大连锁院线AMC娱乐控股(AMC Entertainment Holdings)。到当年年底,他在中国境内的帝国就包括了66座万达广场、38家五星级酒店、980块银幕和57家百货商场,更别说还有63家卡拉 OK店。在接下来的一年时间里,他在海边城市青岛开工建设了一座投资80亿美元的影视制作和主题产业园,莱昂纳多·迪卡普里奥(Leonardo DiCaprio)、妮可·基德曼(Nicole Kidman)、约翰·特拉沃塔(John Travolta)等明星纷纷飞去庆祝。

伴随着成功而来的,是超级富豪标志性的一掷千金。王健林出资2820万美元拍得一幅毕加索(Picasso)的画作。他妻子结交的是摩纳哥的阿尔伯特亲王(Prince Albert)。他儿子雇了韩国的一个顶级流行音乐组合在自己的27岁生日聚会上表演。

不满于仅仅拥有一艘游艇的王健林,收购了一家英国公司。在詹姆斯·邦德(James Bond)系列电影中出现的豪华游艇就是由该公司建造的。今年1月,王健林的公司宣布将购买西班牙某足球俱乐部的部分股份。

"他有一股超人的力量,"与王健林认识超过三年的梦工厂动画电影公司(DreamWorks Animation)首席执行官杰弗里·卡岑伯格(Jeffrey Katzenberg)说。"他的个性非常非常强,对自己在做的事情极度自信。"

王健林的父亲是一名老战士,参加过共产党具有传奇色彩的长征。共产党上世纪30年代那次穿越中国的跋涉充满艰辛,途中伤亡惨重,磨练了一代革 命者。在五兄弟中排行老大的王健林自己,则在十几岁时便效仿父亲参了军。2013年亮相官方电视台时,王健林回忆说,在毛泽东那场狂热的文化大革命期间, 他曾在训练时在及膝深的雪地里走了2000多华里。

"很多人都是,都坚持不下来,"王健林说。但他坚持了下来。后来,在接下来的16年时间里,他在军队里层层晋升。同事称,这一经历让他形成了自己的管理风格。比如,前员工称,在他手下,就连级别最高的万达高管也被要求上下班打卡,迟到是不能容忍的。

退役后,王健林在东北的港口城市大连找到了一份政府工作。当1988年被调到一个日渐衰败的国有住宅楼开发公司时,他的机会来了。在一名老战友的帮助下,他得到了一笔贷款,并让公司扭亏为盈。

1992年,公司重组,成为中国首批股份制公司之一。在接下来的10年,王健林领导该公司实现私有化,并成为其大股东。

那个时期的大部分阶段,大连的市长一直是薄熙来。后来,父亲是党内一名颇具影响的元老的薄熙来升任政治局委员,并在2012年因为一场令人震惊的腐败和谋杀丑闻而下台。

在薄熙来任内,王健林为大连做出了巨大贡献。他买下了该市的足球队,并帮助该队成了全国冠军。王健林还捐出巨资修建学校。

自薄熙来下台后,王健林一直试图撇开与他的关系。前不久接受采访时,王健林称,因为拒绝行贿,且又和薄熙来关系不好,他在那些年里处境艰难。他说,这限制了他拿地,因为薄熙来领导的政府不卖给他。

 "我们还是赚到钱了,但那段时间不好过,"王健林对《彭博市场》(Bloomberg Markets) 杂志表示。

在中国,所有土地的正式所有权都归国家;因此,想在土地上兴建设施的人必须得到国家的同意。多年来,地方政府一直依靠出售长期的土地开发权,为自己的运作提供资金。但谁以什么价位拿到哪些地块,既是经济决策,也是政治决策。

王健林表示,他的公司总是能为有万达的项目的城市带去利益,以至于地方政府现在争相与其建立业务关系,而他要拒绝超过三分之二的提议。

"我们就占据了主动,就具有议价权,"他对哈佛大学的学生说。他接着表示,那就意味着他获得土地的成本,比竞争对手至少便宜一半。

大连万达的招股说明书显示,在中国的房价不断创下新高的同时,该公司购买土地的价格在2011年到2014年期间却下降了逾40%。

中国商业地产联盟副会长王永平说,地方官员都迫切希望与万达合作,一是因为万达的项目为他们带来的税收,另一个原因是万达有雷厉风行的美誉 。能够在18个月内建成一座万达广场,这被称之为"万达速度"。

"中国政府喜欢出政绩,"王永平说。"18个月可能决定他是不是能当区长或省委书记。"

不过,有些掌权者支持王健林却另有原因。

书面记录中的通向权贵之路

2007年7月时,王健林手中还只有几座建成的万达广场。他的资产尚未达到10亿美元,在中国之外几乎没人听说过他或他的公司。在追踪中国富豪净值的胡润百富榜(Hurun Rich List)上,王健林排名第148位。

然而,公司记录显示,那个月末,在北京新成立的一家公司——铭豪控股——获得了王健林名下的旗舰公司万达集团的2.5%的股份,成为最大的外部股东。当时除了铭豪控股之外,万达集团只有一家外部股东,那是王健林的友人在大连经营的一家房地产公司。

这些记录显示,接着,两个月之后,另一家在北京新成立的公司——五谷丰投资咨询公司——获得了大连合兴投资有限公司1.53%的股份,成为万达的第五个股东。王健林是通过持有大连合兴投资的股份来持有他在万达集团的股份的。

这些文件没有显示为何这两家北京的公司会被邀请成为王健林生意的早期投资者。但这两家公司的记录指向了当时中共中央政治局的两名成员的亲属。 这两名政治局委员是多年担任北京市委书记、在中共领导层中排名第四的贾庆林,以及曾经带头支持一项保护私有财产的标志性法律的全国人大高级官员王兆国。 

这些记录显示,王兆国的儿子王新宇是第一家公司的控股股东,该公司后来把万达股权转让给了一个名叫杨欣的年轻女子。据王兆国的堂兄弟王兆安说,杨女士是王兆国的外甥女。王兆安在这个家族的河北老家担任村党委书记 。

记录中显示,第二家公司的所有者名叫潘永斌,63岁,他的公司地址、员工和电话号码与贾庆林的女婿李伯潭在北京经营的一家投资公司相同。潘永斌还是李伯潭拥有的多家公司的董事,包括其名下的主要的投资公司。

随着万达在此后几年的繁荣发展,这些早期投资的价值飙升。

根据万达提交给政府的文件,王兆国之子控制的公司用不到50万美元购买了万达的股份, 不过该公司自己的记录中没有显示这笔交易。这些文件中关于第二家公司的信息更加全面,显示那家公司为万达的股权支付了约20万美元。这两笔股权目前的价值 已分别超过6.4亿美元和2.5亿美元。

这两名政治局委员都没有权力直接为万达购买的土地设定价格,也无权直接批准向万达出售土地使用权的交易。但两人所管辖的中共机构帮助王健林获得了极大的社会认知度。

2008年3月,王健林成了中国人民政治协商会议的三位大陆亿万富豪委员之一,这个国家级的议政机构由贾庆林领导,其成员均是中共领导层眼中 有影响力的人物。一名加入了类似机构的中国商人说,有了这一头衔,相当于得到了中共高层领导人的认可 。为了保护自己的地位,这名商人要求不具名。

2007年6月,王健林还被一个中共管控的行业协会评为杰出企业家,此后四年,他又四次获得由王兆国领导或与他有关的组织所颁发的奖项。

这类荣誉向地方官员和潜在的商业伙伴传递的信息是,荣誉的获得者有很深的背景。"至少在中国境内,人们会更愿意和你做生意,而且冒犯你的可能 性也大大降低," 加州大学圣迭戈分校(University of California, San Diego)的学者史宗瀚(Victor Shih)说。

在2008年末全球金融危机爆发之后,中国的房地产市场急转直下。在2008年一年里,上海的房地产类股票暴跌了65%。

不过,万达集团在这一年的表现令人印象深刻,七座新的万达广场破土动工——创下了有史以来的最高记录——使王健林在胡润百富榜上升至第20位,其财富据估算为23亿美元。

接下来的一年,万达再次向外部股东派发股份, 私下出售了公司8.5%的股权。

万达的八名新投资者中包括一家北京公司,该公司由习近平的姐姐齐桥桥以及她的丈夫邓家贵通过一个控股公司网络所持有。

齐桥桥和习近平都是 "太子党",即一个由中共高级领导人的后代组成的权贵团体的成员。他们已故的父亲习仲勋是毛泽东的战友,曾任副总理,后来成为了中国经济改革的先锋人物。

齐桥桥曾在政府和军队担任过多个职位,此后才成为一名商人。在那段时期,她的弟弟习近平正努力在地方政府中向上攀升。

目前尚不知道齐桥桥和丈夫为何会得到投资万达的机会。2009年时,她已经是一名财力雄厚的投资者,在全国各地都有商业往来。与此同时,她的弟弟则已经成为中国国家副主席,并被外界一致认为将成为中共的下一任领导人。

齐桥桥和邓家贵没有答复时报的置评请求。但记录显示,夫妻二人在2012年开始,退出数以亿计美元的投资,当时习近平开始高调打击官员腐败。抛售行动背后的动机目前还不清楚,但当她弟弟的活动把矛头对准了成千上万的官员时,抛售动作降低了他在政治上受到冲击的可能性。

夫妻二人在出售资产时,许多买家和他们之间都没有明确的联系。

但是二人在万达持有的股份2013年10月8日转让给了一个长期商业伙伴,当时他们股份的估值达2.4亿美元,2009年二人买入时的价格是2860万美元。记录没有显示该名商业伙伴买入的价格,但此人曾与齐桥桥和邓家贵在不同的企业岗位上合作超过10年。

万达的另一个新股东,是由清华控股部分持有并管理的一家投资基金。清华控股是北京名校清华大学的投资机构,当时它的主要负责人是胡海峰,时任国家主席胡锦涛之子。没有迹象显示胡海峰曾得益于万达的股份,也没有迹象表明他本人持有任何万达股份。

一些人获得了早期投资万达的机会,但他们的身份很难确定。其中之一是金怡,她在2009年获得了现在价值约2.5亿美元的股份。但她身份证上的地址并不完整,而且在该社区官方的居民记录中,也并没有她的名字。

然而,公司记录显示,金怡是温如春的商业伙伴。温如春别名常丽丽(Lily Chang),是2003年到2013年在任的前总理温家宝的女儿。在北京一家房地产公司的三名合伙人当中,金怡和常丽丽均名列其中。

推动中国文化

去年在瑞士达沃斯,这个聚集了富人和有权势者的年度盛会上,王健林在小组讨论中坐在高盛(Goldman Sachs)首席执行官劳尔德·贝兰克梵(Lloyd Blankfein)和英国副首相尼克·克莱格(Nick Clegg)之间,几乎没有发言。但是,当一个发言者表示,中国关注于领土争端,削弱了在亚洲的影响力时,这位亿万富翁发怒了。

"今天本来是一个经济论坛,不应该涉及政治,"王健林厉声说,"你公开地挤兑中国,我觉得起码不太礼貌。"

随着王健林的财富日益增多,以及其投资在海外延伸,他已经开始直白地倡导中国的利益。在采访和演讲中,他倾向于把自己描绘成中国大企业中务实的代表人物,向担心中国崛起的外国听众传递充满机会的讯息,试图让他们感到安心。

"从党的角度来看,王健林是个完美的工具,"哈佛大学教授约瑟夫·奈(Joseph Nye)说。奈曾提出了"软实力"这个说法,在王健林发言斥责的那场小组讨论中,奈也出席了。

王健林之所以是一个有效的工具,部分原因在于他已经不再单纯是一个房地产开发商了。随着最近几年北京试图让中国房地产市场降温,他开展多元化 举措,向国外转移投资,并进入了文化娱乐行业;比如他的院线在2012年购买了AMC公司位于美国的4000多块银幕之后,成为了全球最大的连锁影城。

万达采取这种战略之时,恰逢中国领导层努力在国内和国外拓展中国文化的影响力。中国的年轻一代越来越多地转向了西方的音乐、电视和电影。

中共中央委员会在2011年10月发表的一份决定中提到,"增强国家文化软实力、中华文化国际影响力"的要求"更加紧迫"。

"这个纲领性文件之后",万达"就大力发展文化产业",北京的清华-卡内基全球政策中心学者张丽华表示。

一些与中共高层领导人有联系的投资者,得以在早期参与万达的行动。记录显示,2010年12月,贾庆林女婿的投资公司收购了万达旗下连锁影城价值900万美元的股份,截至周一,这些股份已经升值到1.31亿美元。

记录显示,同月还有另一笔早期投资,投资方是私募股权公司新天域资本(New Horizon)管理的一家投资基金。新天域是温家宝的儿子温云松(Winston Wen)联合创办的。这些股权目前价值为5.26亿美元。

中央委员会的决定催生的新政策,令万达这样的房地产企业受益。

比如,地方政府被告知,要把土地使用权优先出让给一些开展中华文化促进项目的企业,国有银行被告知,要提供贷款推动国内外的文化事业。中国进出口银行则同意为万达的海外投资项目提供融资,支持其收购AMC。

除了投资电影产业之外,万达还开办了一系列宣传中国文化的游乐园,其中一个乐园中有一栋建筑,形状如同中式茶壶。王健林说,该乐园要和正在建设中的上海迪士尼乐园开展竞争。

"迪斯尼再好毕竟是美国文化,"他去年在奠基仪式后说。"我们希望用中国文化。"

宾夕法尼亚大学(University of Pennsylvania)研究该公司的学者韩煦表示,万达的海外扩张部分上是北京推动的,因为北京希望看到中国首屈一指的企业能在海外立足。但他表示,该公司更感兴趣的是赚取利润,而不是直接影响外界对中国的意见。

"中央政府的目标是非常明确的,"他说。"拥有一家非常成功的中国公司,这对中国有好处。"

王健林收购AMC时,他保留了美国的管理团队,并强调他的公司不会去决定美国的影院上映哪些电影。

但是由于预计中国到2018年票房收入将超过北美地区,好莱坞已经把注意力投向了中国影迷和审查者,审查者可以决定哪些外国电影可以在中国的影院上映。

王健林经常指出,到2023年,中国市场规模将达到北美市场的两倍。

2013年,王健林邀请迪卡普里奥和基德曼,参加其青岛影视基地的开工仪式。当时他警告说,外国人需要注意上述的新现实。

"世界电影人士谁更早认识到这点,谁更早与中国合作,"他说,"谁就能更早受益。"

傅才德(Michael Forsythe)是《纽约时报》记者。

安思乔(Jonathan Ansfield)自北京和河北唐山石各庄、Julie Hirschfeld Davis自华盛顿协助报道,Kiki Zhao自北京参与研究。

April 28, 2015

Wang Jianlin, a Billionaire at the Intersection of Business and Power in China

By MICHAEL FORSYTHE

HONG KONG — He controls thousands of movie screens around the world, serving more filmgoers than any other cinema chain. He has invested billions of dollars in real estate projects across four continents. He is building skyscrapers that will redraw the skylines of London and Chicago. He is shopping for a Hollywood studio.

There are as many as 430 billionaires in China, more than in any country besides the United States. But Wang Jianlin stands out, and not just because he is the richest person in Asia, with a fortune estimated at more than $35 billion.

As his real estate and entertainment empire expands overseas, Mr. Wang, 60, has emerged as the rare private-sector tycoon in a position to advance Beijing's interests abroad, with clout in industries and communities around the world.

Prime ministers send him thank-you notes, and Hollywood's biggest stars fly to China when he summons them. In March, at an event to woo foreign investors, he was one of only a dozen businessmen to meet President Obama.

How the son of a foot soldier in Mao Zedong's Communist Revolution catapulted into the top tier of the global elite is an archetypal story of China's transition to capitalism and the outsize opportunities it presents those with talent or connections — or, in Mr. Wang's case, both. His story, though, is also singular: He built one of the world's most valuable real estate portfolios in a nation where the state retains ownership of all land.

A yearlong examination of his success by The New York Times casts a light on the murky intersection of business and power at the heights of the Chinese economy, where market competition is often warped by the whims of Communist Party leaders.

Entrepreneurs have powered rapid growth in China for more than three decades. But even the most successful businessmen here must still reach some accommodation with the party, which only a generation ago operated a socialist planned economy.

Mr. Wang says he has prospered by delivering what ambitious party officials crave: showcase real estate developments that propel economic growth and bolster their careers. In return, he says, the officials sell him the rights to develop choice parcels of land at prices far below what his competitors pay.

His conglomerate, Wanda Group, is best known in China for its signature Wanda Plazas, massive shopping complexes with cinemas, office towers, hotels and apartments. Since building the first one in the northeastern city of Changchun in 2002, he has opened more than 100 of them in at least 70 other Chinese cities, generating the revenue that now finances his ambitions abroad.

But there is an aspect of his relationship with the authorities that Mr. Wang never raises in interviews and that has gone unreported in the many accounts of his success published in China and abroad: Relatives of some of the nation's most powerful politicians and their business associates own significant stakes in his company.

An extensive review of corporate records filed with the government identified several such investments made from 2007 to 2011, when Wanda was privately held and rarely sold shares to outsiders.

Among those given an early chance to buy a stake in his company was Qi Qiaoqiao, an active investor who is the elder sister of China's current president, Xi Jinping. (She sold or transferred her shares in the company in October 2013 to a longtime business associate.)

Other early investors included a business partner of the daughter of former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and relatives of two other members of the ruling Politburo at the time, Jia Qinglin and Wang Zhaoguo, according to the records and interviews with family members and business associates.

Together, their stakes in Wang Jianlin's real estate division, Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties, were valued at $1.1 billion when it held an initial public offering in Hong Kong in December. Their shares in Mr. Wang's cinema subsidiary were valued at $17.2 million when it listed separately in January. Their holdings in both companies are worth more than $1.5 billion now.

There is no indication that any of the politicians whose relatives and business associates owned shares in Wanda intervened on the company's behalf in any of its dealings with the government. Nor is there evidence that any of the politicians personally benefited from the windfall that these investors reaped. The investors and officials did not respond to written questions or could not be reached for comment.

Mr. Wang declined an interview request and did not respond to written questions submitted to Wanda. But in public remarks, he often uses the same phrase to describe how he manages his relationship with the authorities: "Stay close to the government and distant from politics."

"It's a fact that China's economy is government-led, and the real estate industry depends on approvals, so if you say you can ignore the government in this business, I'd say that's impossible," Mr. Wang told state television in a February interview. "I'd say it's hypocritical and fake to say that. … But at the same time, for example, we don't pay bribes."

A Remarkable Winning Streak

It was Harvard in September 2012, and students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government were spellbound by an unusual lecturer, a short, plain-talking man with close-set eyes and a prominent widow's peak.

"In China, it's not easy for a company, especially a private company, to be successful and grow," he said through an interpreter. "The hardships they face are many times greater than in the United States."

It would not have been a particularly incisive observation from a member of the faculty. But the speaker that afternoon was Wang Jianlin, and despite the hardships that he described, he was on a remarkable winning streak.

Months earlier, Mr. Wang had purchased AMC Entertainment Holdings, the second-largest theater chain in the United States. By year's end, his empire in China would include 66 Wanda Plazas, 38 five-star hotels, 980 cinema screens and 57 department stores, not to mention 63 karaoke saloons. Within a year, he would break ground on an $8 billion movie studio and theme park in the coastal city of Qingdao, flying in stars such as Leonardo DiCaprio, Nicole Kidman and John Travolta to celebrate.

With success came the familiar trappings of the megarich. Mr. Wang bought a Picasso painting at auction for $28.2 million. His wife socialized with Prince Albert of Monaco. His son hired a top Korean pop group to perform at his 27th birthday party.

Not content with just owning a yacht, Mr. Wang bought the British company that makes the luxury boats seen in James Bond films. In January, his company announced it was buying a stake in a Spanish soccer club.

"He is a force of nature," said Jeffrey Katzenberg, the chief executive of DreamWorks Animation, who has known Mr. Wang for more than three years. "He is a very, very strong personality, and he is extremely confident about what he is doing."

Mr. Wang's father was a veteran of the Communist Party's Long March, the arduous and deadly trek across China in the 1930s by the Communists that hardened a generation of revolutionaries, and Mr. Wang himself, the eldest of five brothers, followed him into the army as a teenager. In a 2013 appearance on state television, he recalled marching hundreds of miles through knee-deep snow in training exercises during Mao's fanatical Cultural Revolution.

"Many people couldn't make it," Mr. Wang said, but he did. He then spent the next 16 years rising through the officer ranks, an experience that colleagues say informs his management style. Even his most senior Wanda executives are required to punch in and out, for example, and tardiness is not tolerated, former employees say.

After leaving the military, Mr. Wang took a government job in the northeastern port city of Dalian. His big break there came in 1988, when he was transferred to a failing state-owned builder of residential apartment blocks. By his own account, he secured a loan with the help of an old army buddy and returned the company to profitability.

In 1992, the firm was restructured as one of China's first shareholding companies, and over the next decade, Mr. Wang oversaw its privatization, emerging as its majority owner.

The mayor of Dalian for much of that time was Bo Xilai, a politician who was the son of an influential party elder and who would rise to the Politburo before falling from power in a stunning corruption and murder scandal in 2012.

Mr. Wang was an extraordinary benefactor to Dalian during Mr. Bo's tenure, buying the city's soccer team, which helped make it a national champion, and donating tens of millions of dollars to build schools.

Since Mr. Bo's fall, Mr. Wang has sought to distance himself from him. In a recent interview, he said he struggled during those years because he refused to pay bribes and did not get along with Mr. Bo. That limited his access to land, he said, which Mr. Bo's administration would not sell him.

"We still made money, but it wasn't a pleasant time," Mr. Wang told Bloomberg Markets magazine.

Because the state retains formal ownership of all land in China, those who want to build on it must have the state's blessing. Local governments have depended for years on the sale of long-term rights to develop land to finance their operations. But who gets which parcels, and at what price, is as much a political decision as an economic one.

Mr. Wang says his company is so good at delivering benefits to the cities where it builds that local governments now compete for his business and he turns down more than two out of every three proposals.

"We thus can take the initiative, and we have the bargaining power," he told the students at Harvard. That means he acquires land at less than half the cost to his competitors, he added.

Even as property prices set records in China, the price that Dalian Wanda paid for access to land fell by more than 40 percent from 2011 to 2014, according to its I.P.O. prospectus.

Wang Yongping, vice chairman of the China Commercial Real Estate Association, said local officials were eager to work with Wanda because of the tax revenue its projects bring them and because it has a reputation for getting things done fast. The company can finish a Wanda Plaza at what it calls Wanda Speed, or within 18 months.

"Chinese government officials love to have achievements when they are in office," Wang Yongping said. "Eighteen months might determine whether they can become a district chief or a provincial party secretary."

But some in power have other reasons to root for Wang Jianlin.

A Paper Trail to the Elite

In July 2007, Mr. Wang had built only a handful of Wanda Plazas. He had yet to make his first billion dollars, and few outside China had heard of him or his company. The Hurun Rich List, which tracks the net worth of the wealthiest people in China, ranked him 148th.

But late that month, a newly formed firm in Beijing, Minghao Holdings, acquired a 2.5 percent stake in Mr. Wang's flagship company, Wanda Group, becoming its largest external shareholder, according to corporate records. There was only one other outside shareholder at the time, a local real estate company in Dalian run by a friend.

Then, two months later, another newly established firm in Beijing, Wugufeng Investment Consulting, took a 1.53 percent stake in the main company that Mr. Wang used to hold his shares in Wanda Group, becoming its fifth shareholder, the records show.

The documents do not indicate why the two Beijing firms were invited to become early investors in Mr. Wang's business. But the paper trail from the companies leads to relatives of two men sitting at the time on the Communist Party's ruling Politburo: Jia Qinglin, a longtime party boss of the Beijing municipality who ranked fourth in the party leadership, and Wang Zhaoguo, a senior legislator who was the leading force behind a landmark law providing legal protections for private property.

Wang Zhaoguo's son, Wang Xinyu, was the controlling shareholder of the first firm, which later transferred its stake in Wanda to a young woman named Yang Xin, the records show. Ms. Yang is the Politburo member's niece, according to Wang Zhao'an, a cousin who serves as party chief in the family's home village in Hebei Province.

The owner of the second firm is listed in the records as Pan Yongbin, 63, who shares a business address, staff and phone numbers with a Beijing investment firm run by Mr. Jia's son-in-law, Li Botan. Mr. Pan is also listed as a board member of several firms owned by Mr. Li, including his main investment company.

As Wanda prospered in the years that followed, the value of these early stakes skyrocketed.

The firm controlled by Wang Zhaoguo's son paid less than $500,000 for its stake, according to Wanda's filings with the government, though the firm's own records do not show the transaction. The documents are more complete for the second firm, showing a payment of less than $200,000 for its stake. Those two stakes are now worth more than $640 million and $250 million.

Neither Politburo member was in a position to directly set the price or approve the sale of land-use rights to Wanda. But party institutions under the two men have showered Wang Jianlin with public recognition.

In March 2008, Mr. Wang was one of only three mainland billionaires named to the standing committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress, a national advisory body, led by Mr. Jia, that is made up of people whom the party leadership deems influential. The appointment amounted to a seal of approval by top party leaders, said one Chinese businessman who serves on a similar body and spoke on the condition of anonymity to protect his position.

In June 2007, Mr. Wang was also named an outstanding private entrepreneur by a party-run industry association, the first of five awards bestowed upon him over the next four years from groups led by or associated with Wang Zhaoguo.

Honors like these can signal to local officials and potential business partners that their recipients are well connected. "At least within China, people will be much more willing to do business with you, and much less likely to offend you," said Victor Shih, a scholar at the University of California, San Diego.

After the global financial crisis in late 2008, China's property market took a nose dive. Real estate stocks in Shanghai ended the year down 65 percent.

But Wanda had a banner year, breaking ground on seven new Wanda Plaza complexes — setting a record — and propelling Wang Jianlin to 20th on the Hurun list of China's richest people, with a fortune estimated at $2.3 billion.

The next year, Wanda distributed shares to outsiders again, privately selling an 8.5 percent stake in the company.

Among the eight new investors was a Beijing firm owned through a network of holding companies by Qi Qiaoqiao, the sister of Xi Jinping, and her husband, Deng Jiagui.

Ms. Qi and Mr. Xi are members of a privileged elite consisting of the offspring of senior party officials. Their now deceased father, Xi Zhongxun, was a military comrade of Mao and later became a vice premier and a pioneer of economic reform.

Ms. Qi worked in a variety of political and military posts during her career before becoming a businesswoman. During that time, her younger brother, Mr. Xi, was working his way up through the ranks in provincial government posts.

It is not known why Ms. Qi and her husband were offered the chance to invest in Wanda. By 2009, she was already a wealthy investor with business relationships across the country. Meanwhile, her brother had become China's vice president and was the consensus candidate to become the party's next leader.

Ms. Qi and Mr. Deng did not respond to a request for comment. But records show the couple began selling off or transferring hundreds of millions of dollars in investments in 2012 as President Xi embarked on a high-profile crackdown on official corruption. The motivation behind this sell-off is unclear but it had the effect of reducing her brother's political vulnerability as his campaign targeted thousands of officials.

In many cases, the couple sold their investments to individuals with no clear connection to them.

But the shares in Wanda — valued at $240 million now, up from the $28.6 million the couple paid for them in 2009 — were transferred to a longtime business associate on Oct. 8, 2013. The records give no indication of the price paid by the business associate, who has served the couple in various corporate posts for more than a decade.

Another new shareholder in Wanda was an investment fund owned in part and managed by a subsidiary of Tsinghua Holdings, the investment arm of Beijing's prestigious Tsinghua University. At the time, the top official at Tsinghua Holdings was Hu Haifeng, the son of Hu Jintao, then China's president. There is no indication Hu Haifeng personally benefited from or held any shares in Wanda himself.

Some of the individuals given an early chance to invest in Wanda are difficult to identify. One of them, Jin Yi, acquired a stake in 2009 that is now worth about $250 million. But the address on her identity card is incomplete, and her name is not included on the official registry of residents in the neighborhood listed.

Corporate records indicate, however, that Ms. Jin is a business associate of Wen Ruchun, the daughter of Wen Jiabao, the prime minister from 2003 to 2013. Ms. Jin is listed as one of three partners in a Beijing real estate firm alongside Lily Chang, an alias used by Ms. Wen.

Promoting Chinese Culture

Seated between Lloyd Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman Sachs, and Nick Clegg, the deputy prime minister of Britain, Wang Jianlin had little to say through much of a panel discussion last year at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the annual gathering of the wealthy and powerful. But when a speaker suggested that China's focus on territorial disputes diminished its influence in Asia, the billionaire bristled.

"This is a discussion on economics today and shouldn't delve into politics," Mr. Wang snapped. "You are publicly saying bad things about China — at the very least, I don't think this is very polite."

As his fortune has climbed and his investments have stretched overseas, Mr. Wang has emerged as an outspoken advocate for his homeland. In interviews and speeches, he tends to present himself as the pragmatic face of big business in China, delivering a soothing message of opportunity to foreign audiences anxious about the country's rise.

"Wang Jianlin is a perfect instrument for that from the party's point of view," said Joseph Nye, the Harvard professor who coined the term "soft power" and was the panelist scolded by Mr. Wang at Davos.

Mr. Wang is effective in part because he is no longer simply a Chinese real estate developer. As Beijing sought to cool its property sector in recent years, he diversified by shifting investments abroad and into the culture and entertainment sector, including his network of movie theaters, which became the world's largest in 2012 with the purchase of AMC's 4,000-plus screens in the United States.

The strategy coincided with a policy push by the Chinese leadership to expand the nation's cultural influence both overseas and at home, where younger generations have increasingly turned to Western music, television and films.

A communiqué issued by the party's Central Committee in October 2011 cited an "urgency for China to strengthen its cultural soft power and global cultural influence."

"After this document, Wanda started to put a lot of effort into developing the cultural industry," said Zhang Lihua, a scholar at the Tsinghua-Carnegie Center for Global Policy in Beijing.

Investors connected to senior party leaders were able to get in early on Wanda's move. In December 2010, the investment firm of Mr. Jia's son-in-law acquired a $9 million stake in Wanda's cinema subsidiary, records show. As of Monday, the stake was worth $131 million.

The records also show another early investment that same month by an investment fund run by New Horizon, a private equity firm co-founded by Mr. Wen's son, Winston Wen. On Monday, that stake was valued at $526 million.

The Central Committee's decision resulted in new policies that benefited real estate companies such as Wanda.

Local governments, for example, were told to prioritize the sale of land-use rights to companies that built projects that promote Chinese culture. And state-owned banks were told to offer loans for cultural undertakings at home and abroad. The state export-import bank agreed to help finance Wanda's overseas investments, backing its acquisition of AMC.

In addition to investing in the movie industry, Wanda has opened a series of amusement parks that promote Chinese culture, including one that features a building in the shape of a Chinese teapot and that Mr. Wang says will compete with a Disneyland under construction in Shanghai.

"No matter how good Disney is, it is still American culture," he said after the groundbreaking ceremony last year. "We hope to use Chinese culture."

Xu Han, a scholar at the University of Pennsylvania who has studied the company, said Wanda's overseas expansion was driven in part by Beijing's desire to see the nation's premier companies build a presence abroad. But he said the firm was more interested in profit than in directly influencing public opinion about China.

"The central government's objective is very clear," he said. "To have a very successful Chinese company is good for China."

When Mr. Wang bought AMC, he retained the American management team and emphasized that his company would not dictate what films were shown in American theaters.

But with China forecast to surpass North America in box office revenue by 2018, Hollywood is already focused on serving Chinese filmgoers and satisfying the censors who determine what foreign films can be shown in Chinese theaters.

Mr. Wang often notes that the Chinese market will be twice the size of the North American market by 2023.

Foreigners need to heed this new reality, he warned when he hosted Mr. DiCaprio and Ms. Kidman for the 2013 groundbreaking of his Qingdao studio.

"Those in the world film industry who realize this first and are among the first to cooperate with China," he said, "will be the first to reap the benefits."

Jonathan Ansfield contributed reporting from Beijing and Shigezhuang, Hebei. Julie Hirschfeld Davis contributed reporting from Washington. Kiki Zhao contributed research from Beijing.

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Influential Stakeholders

Relatives of some of China's most powerful politicians and their business associates have acquired millions of shares of Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties and Wanda Cinema Line, both companies controlled by Wang Jianlin, Asia's richest person.


Wang Jianlin, a Billionaire at the Intersection of Business and Power in China - NYTimes.com


HONG KONG — He controls thousands of movie screens around the world, serving more filmgoers than any other cinema chain. He has invested billions of dollars in real estate projects across four continents. He is building skyscrapers that will redraw the skylines of London and Chicago. He is shopping for a Hollywood studio.

There are as many as 430 billionaires in China, more than in any country besides the United States. But Wang Jianlin stands out, and not just because he is the richest person in Asia, with a fortune estimated at more than $35 billion.

As his real estate and entertainment empire expands overseas, Mr. Wang, 60, has emerged as the rare private-sector tycoon in a position to advance Beijing's interests abroad, with clout in industries and communities around the world.

Prime ministers send him thank-you notes, and Hollywood's biggest stars fly to China when he summons them. In March, at an event to woo foreign investors, he was one of only a dozen businessmen to meet President Obama.

How the son of a foot soldier in Mao Zedong's Communist Revolution catapulted into the top tier of the global elite is an archetypal story of China's transition to capitalism and the outsize opportunities it presents those with talent or connections — or, in Mr. Wang's case, both. His story, though, is also singular: He built one of the world's most valuable real estate portfolios in a nation where the state retains ownership of all land.

A yearlong examination of his success by The New York Times casts a light on the murky intersection of business and power at the heights of the Chinese economy, where market competition is often warped by the whims of Communist Party leaders.

Entrepreneurs have powered rapid growth in China for more than three decades. But even the most successful businessmen here must still reach some accommodation with the party, which only a generation ago operated a socialist planned economy.

Mr. Wang says he has prospered by delivering what ambitious party officials crave: choice real estate developments that propel economic growth and bolster their careers. In return, he says, the officials sell him the rights to develop choice parcels of land at prices far below what his competitors pay.

His conglomerate, Wanda Group, is best known in China for its signature Wanda Plazas, massive shopping complexes with cinemas, office towers, hotels and apartments. Since building the first one in the northeastern city of Changchun in 2002, he has opened more than 100 of them in at least 70 other Chinese cities, generating the revenue that now finances his ambitions abroad.

But there is an aspect of his relationship with the authorities that Mr. Wang never raises in interviews and that has gone unreported in the many accounts of his success published in China and abroad: Relatives of some of the nation's most powerful politicians and their business associates own significant stakes in his company.

An extensive review of corporate records filed with the government identified several such investments made from 2007 to 2011, when Wanda was privately held and rarely sold shares to outsiders.

Among those given an early chance to buy a stake in his company was Qi Qiaoqiao, an active investor who is the elder sister of China's current president, Xi Jinping. (She sold or transferred her shares in the company in October 2013 to a longtime business associate.)

Other early investors included a business partner of the daughter of former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, and relatives of two other members of the ruling Politburo at the time, Jia Qinglin and Wang Zhaoguo, according to the records and interviews with family members and business associates.

Together, their stakes in Wang Jianlin's real estate division, Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties, were valued at $1.1 billion when it held an initial public offering in Hong Kong in December. Their shares in Mr. Wang's cinema subsidiary were valued at $17.2 million when it listed separately in January. Their holdings in both companies are worth more than $1.5 billion now.

There is no indication that any of the politicians whose relatives and business associates owned shares in Wanda intervened on the company's behalf in any of its dealings with the government. Nor is there evidence that any of the politicians personally benefited from the windfall that these investors reaped. The investors and officials did not respond to written questions or could not be reached for comment.

Mr. Wang declined an interview request and did not respond to written questions submitted to Wanda. But in public remarks, he often uses the same phrase to describe how he manages his relationship with the authorities: "Stay close to the government and distant from politics."

"It's a fact that China's economy is government-led, and the real estate industry depends on approvals, so if you say you can ignore the government in this business, I'd say that's impossible," Mr. Wang told state television in a February interview. "I'd say it's hypocritical and fake to say that. ... But at the same time, for example, we don't pay bribes."

A Remarkable Winning Streak

It was September 2012, and students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard were spellbound by an unusual lecturer, a short, plain-talking man with close-set eyes and a prominent widow's peak.

"In China, it's not easy for a company, especially a private company, to be successful and grow," he said through an interpreter. "The hardships they face are many times greater than in the United States."

It would not have been a particularly incisive observation from a member of the faculty. But the speaker that afternoon was Mr. Wang, and despite the hardships that he described, he was on a remarkable winning streak.

Months earlier, Mr. Wang had purchased AMC Entertainment Holdings, the second-largest theater chain in the United States. By year's end, his empire in China would include 66 Wanda Plazas, 38 five-star hotels, 980 cinema screens and 57 department stores, not to mention 63 karaoke saloons. Within a year, he would break ground on an $8 billion movie studio and theme park in the coastal city of Qingdao, flying in stars such as Leonardo DiCaprio, Nicole Kidman and John Travolta to celebrate.

With success came the familiar trappings of the megarich. Mr. Wang bought a Picasso painting at auction for $28.2 million. His wife socialized with Prince Albert of Monaco. His son hired a top Korean pop group to perform at his 27th birthday party.

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Not content with just owning a yacht, Mr. Wang bought the British company that makes the luxury boats seen in James Bond films. In January, his company announced it was buying a stake in a Spanish soccer club.

"He is a force of nature," said Jeffrey Katzenberg, the chief executive of DreamWorks Animation, who has known Mr. Wang for three years. "He is a very, very strong personality, and he is extremely confident about what he is doing."

Mr. Wang's father was a veteran of the Communist Party's Long March, the arduous and deadly trek across China in the 1930s by the Communists that hardened a generation of revolutionaries, and Mr. Wang himself, the eldest of five brothers, followed him into the army as a teenager. In a 2013 appearance on state television, he recalled marching hundreds of miles through knee-deep snow in training exercises during Mao's fanatical Cultural Revolution.

"Many people couldn't make it," Mr. Wang said, but he did. He then spent the next 16 years rising through the officer ranks, an experience that colleagues say informs his management style. Even his most senior Wanda executives are required to punch in and out, for example, and tardiness is not tolerated, former employees say.

After leaving the military, Mr. Wang took a government job in the northeastern port city of Dalian. His big break there came in 1988, when he was transferred to a failing state-owned builder of residential apartment blocks. By his own account, he secured a loan with the help of an old army buddy and returned the company to profitability.

In 1992, the firm was restructured as one of China's first shareholding companies, and over the next decade, Mr. Wang oversaw its privatization, emerging as its majority owner.

The mayor of Dalian for much of that time was Bo Xilai, a politician who was the son of an influential party elder and who would rise to the Politburo before falling from power in a stunning corruption and murder scandal in 2012.

Mr. Wang was an extraordinary benefactor to Dalian during Mr. Bo's tenure, buying the city's soccer team, which helped make it a national champion, and donating tens of millions of dollars to build schools.

Since Mr. Bo's fall, Mr. Wang has sought to distance himself from him. In a recent interview, he said he struggled during those years because he refused to pay bribes and did not get along with Mr. Bo. That limited his access to land, he said, which Mr. Bo's administration would not sell him.

"We still made money, but it wasn't a pleasant time," Mr. Wang told Bloomberg Markets magazine.

Because the state retains formal ownership of all land in China, those who want to build on it must have the state's blessing. Local governments have depended for years on the sale of long-term rights to develop land to finance their operations. But who gets which parcels, and at what price, is as much a political decision as an economic one.

Photo Mr. Wang has emerged as the rare private-sector tycoon in a position to advance Beijing's interests abroad, with international clout. Credit Adam Dean for The New York Times

Mr. Wang says his company is so good at delivering benefits to the cities where it builds that local governments now compete for his business and he turns down more than two out of every three proposals.

"We thus can take the initiative, and we have the bargaining power," he told the students at Harvard. That means he acquires land at less than half the cost to his competitors, he added.

Even as property prices set records in China, the price that Dalian Wanda paid for access to land fell by more than 40 percent from 2011 to 2014, according to its I.P.O. prospectus.

Wang Yongping, vice chairman of the China Commercial Real Estate Association, said local officials were eager to work with Wanda because of the tax revenue its projects bring them and because it has a reputation for getting things done fast. The company can finish a Wanda Plaza at what it calls Wanda Speed, or within 18 months.

"Chinese government officials love to have achievements when they are in office," Wang Yongping said. "Eighteen months might determine whether they can become a district chief or a provincial party secretary."

But some in power have other reasons to root for Wang Jianlin.

A Paper Trail to the Elite

In July 2007, Mr. Wang had built only a handful of Wanda Plazas. He had yet to make his first billion dollars, and few outside China had heard of him or his company. The Hurun Rich List, which tracks the net worth of the wealthiest people in China, ranked him 148th.

But late that month, a newly formed firm in Beijing, Minghao Holdings, acquired a 2.5 percent stake in Mr. Wang's flagship company, Wanda Group, becoming its largest external shareholder, according to corporate records. There was only one other outside shareholder at the time, a local real estate company in Dalian run by a friend.

Then, two months later, another newly established firm in Beijing, Wugufeng Investment Consulting, took a 1.53 percent stake in the main company that Mr. Wang used to hold his shares in Wanda Group, becoming its fifth shareholder, the records show.

The documents do not indicate why the two Beijing firms were invited to become early investors in Mr. Wang's business. But the paper trail from the companies leads to relatives of two men sitting at the time on the Communist Party's ruling Politburo: Jia Qinglin, a longtime party boss of the Beijing municipality who ranked fourth in the party leadership, and Wang Zhaoguo, a senior legislator who was the leading force behind a landmark law providing legal protections for private property.

Wang Zhaoguo's son, Wang Xinyu, was the controlling shareholder of the first firm, which later transferred its stake in Wanda to a young woman named Yang Xin, the records show. Ms. Yang is the Politburo member's niece, according to Wang Zhao'an, a cousin who serves as party chief in the family's home village in Hebei Province.

The owner of the second firm is listed in the records as Pan Yongbin, 63, who shares a business address, staff and phone numbers with a Beijing investment firm run by Mr. Jia's son-in-law, Li Botan. Mr. Pan is also listed as a board member of several firms owned by Mr. Li, including his main investment company.

As Wanda prospered in the years that followed, the value of these early stakes skyrocketed.

The firm controlled by Wang Zhaoguo's son paid less than $500,000 for its stake, according to Wanda's filings with the government, though the firm's own records do not show the transaction. The documents are more complete for the second firm, showing a payment of less than $200,000 for its stake. Those two stakes are now worth more than $640 million and $250 million.

Neither Politburo member was in a position to directly set the price or approve the sale of land-use rights to Wanda. But party institutions under the two men have showered Wang Jianlin with public recognition.

In March 2008, Mr. Wang was one of only three mainland billionaires named to the standing committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress, a national advisory body, led by Mr. Jia, that is made up of people whom the party leadership deems influential. The appointment amounted to a seal of approval by top party leaders, said one Chinese businessman who serves on a similar body and spoke on the condition of anonymity to protect his position.

In June 2007, Mr. Wang was also named an outstanding private entrepreneur by a party-run industry association, the first of five awards bestowed upon him over the next four years from groups led by or associated with Wang Zhaoguo.

Honors like these can signal to local officials and potential business partners that their recipients are well connected. "At least within China, people will be much more willing to do business with you, and much less likely to offend you," said Victor Shih, a scholar at the University of California, San Diego.

After the global financial crisis in late 2008, China's property market took a nose dive. Real estate stocks in Shanghai ended the year down 65 percent.

But Wanda had a banner year, breaking ground on seven new Wanda Plaza complexes — setting a record — and propelling Wang Jianlin to 20th on the Hurun list of China's richest people, with a fortune estimated at $2.3 billion.

The next year, Wanda distributed shares to outsiders again, privately selling an 8.5 percent stake in the company.

Among the eight new investors was a Beijing firm owned through a network of holding companies by Qi Qiaoqiao, the sister of Xi Jinping, and her husband, Deng Jiagui.

Ms. Qi and Mr. Xi are members of a privileged elite consisting of the offspring of senior party officials. Their now deceased father, Xi Zhongxun, was a military comrade of Mao and later became a vice premier and a pioneer of economic reform.

Ms. Qi worked in a variety of political and military posts during her career before becoming a businesswoman. During that time, her younger brother, Mr. Xi, was working his way up through the ranks in provincial government posts.

It is not known why Ms. Qi and her husband were offered the chance to invest in Wanda. By 2009, she was already a wealthy investor with business relationships across the country. Meanwhile, her brother had become China's vice president and was the consensus candidate to become the party's next leader.

Photo When Mr. Wang broke ground on an $8 billion movie studio and theme park in the coastal city of Qingdao in 2013, the stars he flew in to celebrate included Leonardo DiCaprio. Credit Jason Lee/Reuters

Ms. Qi and Mr. Deng did not respond to a request for comment. But records show the couple began selling off or transferring hundreds of millions of dollars in investments in 2012 as President Xi embarked on a high-profile crackdown on official corruption. The motivation behind this sell-off is unclear but it had the effect of reducing her brother's political vulnerability as his campaign targeted thousands of officials.

In many cases, the couple sold their investments to individuals with no clear connection to them.

But the shares in Wanda — valued at $240 million now, up from the $28.6 million the couple paid for them in 2009 — were transferred to a longtime business associate on Oct. 8, 2013. The records give no indication of the price paid by the business associate, who has served the couple in various corporate posts for more than a decade.

Another new shareholder in Wanda was an investment fund owned in part and managed by a subsidiary of Tsinghua Holdings, the investment arm of Beijing's prestigious Tsinghua University. At the time, the top official at Tsinghua Holdings was Hu Haifeng, the son of Hu Jintao, then China's president. There is no indication Hu Haifeng personally benefited from or held any shares in Wanda himself.

Some of the individuals given an early chance to invest in Wanda are difficult to identify. One of them, Jin Yi, acquired a stake in 2009 that is now worth about $250 million. But the address on her identity card is incomplete, and her name is not included on the official registry of residents in the neighborhood listed.

Corporate records indicate, however, that Ms. Jin is a business associate of Wen Ruchun, the daughter of Wen Jiabao, the prime minister from 2003 to 2013. Ms. Jin is listed as one of three partners in a Beijing real estate firm alongside Lily Chang, an alias used by Ms. Wen.

Promoting Chinese Culture

Seated between Lloyd Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman Sachs, and Nick Clegg, the deputy prime minister of Britain, Wang Jianlin had little to say through much of a panel discussion last year at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the annual gathering of the wealthy and powerful. But when a speaker suggested that China's focus on territorial disputes diminished its influence in Asia, the billionaire bristled.

"This is a discussion on economics today and shouldn't delve into politics," Mr. Wang snapped. "You are publicly saying bad things about China — at the very least, I don't think this is very polite."

As his fortune has climbed and his investments have stretched overseas, Mr. Wang has emerged as an outspoken advocate for his homeland. In interviews and speeches, he tends to present himself as the pragmatic face of big business in China, delivering a soothing message of opportunity to foreign audiences anxious about the country's rise.

"Wang Jianlin is a perfect instrument for that from the party's point of view," said Joseph Nye, the Harvard professor who coined the term "soft power" and was the panelist scolded by Mr. Wang at Davos.

Mr. Wang is effective in part because he is no longer simply a Chinese real estate developer. As Beijing sought to cool its property sector in recent years, he diversified by shifting investments abroad and into the culture and entertainment sector, including his network of movie theaters, which became the world's largest in 2012 with the purchase of AMC's 4,000-plus screens in the United States.

The strategy coincided with a policy push by the Chinese leadership to expand the nation's cultural influence both overseas and at home, where younger generations have increasingly turned to Western music, television and films.

A communiqué issued by the party's Central Committee in October 2011 cited an "urgency for China to strengthen its cultural soft power and global cultural influence."

"After this document, Wanda started to put a lot of effort into developing the cultural industry," said Zhang Lihua, a scholar at the Tsinghua-Carnegie Center for Global Policy in Beijing.

Investors connected to senior party leaders were able to get in early on Wanda's move. In December 2010, the investment firm of Mr. Jia's son-in-law acquired a $9 million stake in Wanda's cinema subsidiary, records show. As of Monday, the stake was worth $131 million.

The records also show another early investment that same month by an investment fund run by New Horizon, a private equity firm co-founded by Mr. Wen's son, Winston Wen. On Monday, that stake was valued at $526 million.

The Central Committee's decision resulted in new policies that benefited real estate companies such as Wanda.

Local governments, for example, were told to prioritize the sale of land-use rights to companies that built projects that promote Chinese culture. And state-owned banks were told to offer loans for cultural undertakings at home and abroad. The state export-import bank agreed to help finance Wanda's overseas investments, backing its acquisition of AMC.

In addition to investing in the movie industry, Wanda has opened a series of amusement parks that promote Chinese culture, including one that features a building in the shape of a Chinese teapot. Mr. Wang says it will compete with a Disneyland under construction in Shanghai.

"No matter how good Disney is, it is still American culture," he said after the groundbreaking ceremony last year. "We hope to use Chinese culture."

Xu Han, a scholar at the University of Pennsylvania who has studied the company, said Wanda's overseas expansion was driven in part by Beijing's desire to see the nation's premier companies build a presence abroad. But he said the firm was more interested in profit than in directly influencing public opinion about China.

"The central government's objective is very clear," he said. "To have a very successful Chinese company is good for China."

When Mr. Wang bought AMC, he retained the American management team and emphasized that his company would not dictate what films were shown in American theaters.

But with China forecast to surpass North America in box office revenue by 2018, Hollywood is already focused on serving Chinese filmgoers and satisfying the censors who determine what foreign films can be shown in Chinese theaters.

Mr. Wang often notes that the Chinese market will be twice the size of the North American market by 2023.

Foreigners need to heed this new reality, he warned when he hosted Mr. DiCaprio and Ms. Kidman for the 2013 groundbreaking of his Qingdao studio.

"Those in the world film industry who realize this first and are among the first to cooperate with China," he said, "will be the first to reap the benefits."

Jonathan Ansfield contributed reporting from Beijing and Shigezhuang, Hebei. Julie Hirschfeld Davis contributed reporting from Washington. Kiki Zhao contributed research from Beijing.

A version of this article appears in print on April 29, 2015, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Billionaire at the Intersection of China's Business and Power.

寻找万达帝国背后的神秘股东 Who Owns Shares in Wang Jianlin’s Empire? Names Are Just a Start

2015年04月29日

寻找万达帝国背后的神秘股东

傅才德

从北京工人体育场附近一座破旧楼房的黑暗楼道上到六层,有一扇贴满了通知的大门。其中一则通知要求房主支付两年的垃圾收集费。另一则来自自来水公司,称因家中无人,工作人员不能进公寓读水表。

这个公寓是杨欣的合法住所。现年33岁的杨欣是中国最富有的女人之一,持有大连万达商业地产(简称万达商业)逾6亿美元(约合37亿元人民币)的股份,万达商业是王健林的万达集团下属的商业地产公司。

根据报给政府的企业记录,杨欣是拥有大量万达股份的几位中国最高层领导人的亲属及其商业伙伴之一。时报用了一年的时间查阅报给政府的企业记录,以搞清楚王健林是怎样成为亚洲首富的,他拥有的财富据估算超过350亿美元。

 但是,确定王健林房地产和娱乐帝国的投资者的身份是一项复杂的工作,包括确定杨欣的身份。尽管中国政府近年来在公开公司记录上已经有所改进,但股东往往通过控股公司来层层掩盖他们的投资。而且,即使名字被公开,在没有更多确认信息时,名字本身可能也没有任何意义。

杨欣在2008年得到了万达的股份,那时她刚过26岁生日没几周,她的名字被列入大连万达上报给工商总局的股东名单中。但她的名字很常见,男性和女性都能用。中国大约有4270万杨姓人氏,比美国加利福利亚州的人口还要多。

记者在她的老家河北唐山石各庄找到了一位她的亲戚,这时她与一名中共高级官员的关系才变得明晰。皮肤黝黑、饱经沧桑的王兆安是该村的党委书记,他说,杨欣是自己堂兄弟王兆国的外甥女,王兆国在2003至2013年间曾担任中共中央政治局委员和全国人大常委会副委员长。

没能联系到杨欣对此事发表评论。王家在北京市中心的住宅曾是一座18世纪的王府,前往采访的记者被拒之门外。

另一位投资者的文件线索把记者带到北京东部的一个老式公寓楼群。63岁的潘永斌家住12层,家门外有一堆塑料的空油瓶子,一年多前的一个下午,他穿着汗衫和睡裤从房门里走了出来。

潘永斌被列为北京一家公司的唯一股东,该公司于2007年向大连合兴投资了约16万美元,王健林用大连合兴作为自己企业的主要持股公司。这笔投资后来转化为万达房地产子公司的股份,截至周一,市值已超过2.5亿美元。

潘永斌指着自己的左腿说他在家病休。他承认拥有股份,但拒绝透露详情。他说,"现在说话不方便,我的健康状况很不好。我不能回答你的问题。"

他的公司提交给政府以及在线数据库的记录都对公众开放,记录显示,公司地址在北京市中心标志性的、巧克力色的中信国际大厦的顶层。乘电梯上去,就进了北京昭德投资有限公司的大理石铺地的大堂,公司董事长李伯潭是原中共中央政治局常委贾庆林的女婿。

潘永斌是昭德董事会的成员,也是李伯潭其它几家公司的高级管理人员。李伯潭没有回复采访请求,也未回答发到他办公室的书面问题。

一些公司记录中包括股东的身份证复印件。但一位名叫金怡的万达神秘股东的身份证上写的地址不完整。

现年50岁的金怡是2009年有机会获得万达股份的为数不多的投资者之一。那些股份如今的市值已超过2.5亿美元。

她的身份证上是一张留着齐肩烫发、穿着高领上衣的年轻女子的照片,证上提供的地址在柳林,中国北方省份山西的一个煤矿小镇。但没有街道名称,只给了社区名。在当地政府部门记载有约4000个名字的厚厚四本正式户口登记簿中,没有找到一位姓金的人。

但是,通过一次记录检索可以找到另一家公司,股东之一也叫金怡,使用同一个18位数的身份证号码。

那是北京的一家房地产公司,只有另外两名股东。一位叫段伟红,她是有名的女商人,她的公司泰鸿集团是中国前总理温家宝的母亲及其他亲属用来持有一家保险公司股份的投资工具。

另一名股东在公司记录中用的名字是常丽丽(Lily Chang),这是温家宝女儿温如春用过的别名。

未能联系到温如春对此事发表评论,发到其公司办公室的留言和采访要求没有得到答复。

段伟红对采访请求未作答复。与她的丈夫沈栋(Desmond Shum)接通电话后,他称对谈话"没有兴趣"。"不要再给我打电话了,"他说。

傅才德(Michael Forsythe)是《纽约时报》记者。

安思乔(Jonathan Ansfield)对本文有报道贡献,Kiki Zhao对本文有研究贡献。

翻译:Cindy Hao


April 29, 2015

Who Owns Shares in Wang Jianlin's Empire? Names Are Just a Start

By MICHAEL FORSYTHE

Up a dark stairwell on the sixth floor of a decrepit building near the Workers' Stadium in Beijing is a door covered with notices. One demands payment for two years of garbage collection fees. Another from the water company says a worker could not enter the apartment to check the meter because no one was home.

This is the legal residence of one of the richest women in China: Yang Xin, 33, the owner of more than $600 million in shares of Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties, the real estate division of Wang Jianlin's Wanda Group.

Ms. Yang is one of several relatives of top Chinese leaders and their business associates who own significant stakes in Wanda, according to corporate records filed with the government that were reviewed in a yearlong examination of how Mr. Wang became the richest man in Asia, with an estimated fortune of more than $35 billion.

But identifying Ms. Yang and other investors in Mr. Wang's real estate and entertainment empire was a complicated task. While the Chinese government has improved access to business records in recent years, shareholders often cloak their investments through layers of holding companies. And even when a name is disclosed, it can be meaningless without additional identifying information.

Ms. Yang, who acquired the stake in Wanda a few weeks after her 26th birthday in 2008, was included on a list of shareholders in documents filed by Dalian Wanda with the State Administration of Industry and Commerce. But her name is a common one, used by both men and women. There are about 42.7 million people in China with the surname Yang, more than the population of California.

It was only after locating a relative in her home village of Shigezhuang in the northern province of Hebei that her relationship with a senior Communist Party official became clear. She is the niece of Wang Zhaoguo, a member of the ruling Politburo and the vice chairman of the Chinese legislature from 2003 to 2013, according to Wang Zhao'an, a tanned and weathered cousin of the Chinese leader who serves as the village's party chief.

Ms. Yang could not be located for comment, and a reporter who visited the Wang family's home, in an 18th-century prince's residence in central Beijing, was turned away.

The paper trail for another investor led to an aging apartment block in eastern Beijing. A pile of empty, plastic cooking-oil bottles sat outside the 12th-floor home of Pan Yongbin, 63, who emerged one afternoon more than a year ago in an undershirt and pajama bottoms.

Mr. Pan was listed as sole owner of a Beijing firm that in 2007 invested about $160,000 in Dalian Hexing Investment, the main company that Wang Jianlin uses to hold shares in his businesses. That investment, which was later converted into a stake in Wanda's real estate subsidiary, was worth more than $250 million as of Monday.

Gesturing toward his left leg, Mr. Pan said he was home from work on sick leave. He acknowledged ownership of the shares but declined to elaborate. "It's not good for me to talk right now, my health is very bad," he said. "I can't answer your questions."

His firm's records, both filed with the government and in online databases open to the public, show his business address to be on the top floor of the iconic, chocolate-colored Citic International building in downtown Beijing. The elevator opens into the marbled lobby of Beijing Zhaode Investment, whose chairman is Li Botan, the son-in-law of the former Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin.

Mr. Pan sits on Zhaode's board and is an officer in several of Mr. Li's other companies. Mr. Li did not respond to interview requests or written questions sent to his office.

Some corporate records include copies of the identification cards of shareholders. But the address listed on the card for a mysterious Wanda shareholder named Jin Yi was incomplete.

Ms. Jin, 50, was among a limited number of investors who were given the chance to acquire a stake in Wanda in 2009. Those shares are now worth more than $250 million.

Her identification card, which included a photo of a young woman with wavy, shoulder-length hair wearing a high-collared blouse, provides an address in Liulin, a coal-mining town in China's northern Shanxi Province. But no street name is listed, only a neighborhood. And no one with the surname Jin could be found in the official registry of residents in the neighborhood — four thick binders in a local government office with some 4,000 names.

But a record search uncovered another company with a shareholder named Jin Yi using the same 18-digit identification number.

That firm, a Beijing real estate company, had only two other shareholders. One is Duan Weihong, a prominent businesswoman whose company, Taihong, was the investment vehicle for shares in an insurance company held by the mother and other relatives of former Premier Wen Jiabao.

The other shareholder is identified in company records as Lily Chang, the alias used by Mr. Wen's daughter, Wen Ruchun.

Ms. Wen could not be reached for comment, and messages and interview requests submitted at the company's offices went unanswered.

Ms. Duan did not respond to interview requests. Reached by telephone, her husband, Desmond Shum, said he had "no interest" in talking. "Do not call me again," he said.

Jonathan Ansfield contributed reporting and Kiki Zhao contributed research.

弗朗西斯·福山:历史终结、政治秩序与中国 ; 弗朗西斯·福山:中国精英阶层构成改革阻力(下)

弗朗西斯·福山:历史终结、政治秩序与中国

美国学者弗朗西斯·福山。

美国学者弗朗西斯·福山。

Noah Berger for The New York Times

 这是作者今年4月对弗朗西斯·福山(Francis Fukuyama)专访内容的上篇,点击此处阅读下篇。

去年9月,斯坦福大学知名政治学家弗朗西斯·福山(Francis Fukuyama)的新书《政治秩序和政治衰败》(Political Order and Political Decay)出版发行,随即收获了全球范围的关注。书中指出了美国政体的诸多弊端,警示了"政治衰败"的风险。

对此,各界纷纷发出疑问,上世纪九十年代对自由民主制充满自信的福 山,学术思想是否发生了重大转折,这其中也不乏中国官方媒体的评论——认为福山基于20年的观察,对其理论进行了大幅调整,以至于承认相较于民主和法治而 言,国家能力对繁荣更为重要,而这恰恰契合了中国改革开放以来的高速发展模式。但在笔者去年11月同福山进行的访谈中,他强调,这种解读误解了他的想法。 "我的论点是,一个有效的政治体制必须让国家能力与民主和法治相平衡。"他说,"我认为美国和其他一些民主国家过于强调限制国家权力,以至于把我们逼到了 无法做出艰难抉择的处境。但我觉得中国正相反,国家能力与法治、民主之间仍不够平衡,而这也并非是一种良好的情况。"

4月初,福山在其斯坦福大学的办公室再次接受了笔者的采访,我们深 入探讨了不同政治制度的发展趋势。这一问题自1989年初福山发表《历史的终结?》(The End of History)一文至今,已经引发了学界的广泛辩论。福山在文中断言,民主制将"成为全世界最终的政府形式"。这一论述无异于在学界投下了一颗巨石,而 随着几个月后柏林墙的骤然倒塌,一石激起千层浪。他随即在这篇文章的基础上加以扩充,删去了原标题的问号,于1992年出版了评述和争议延续至今的著作 《历史的终结及最后之人》(The End of History and the Last Man)。福山所谓的"历史",并不是我们通常意义上所说的过往事件,而是指"人类活动洪流中体现的有意义的秩序"。他援引了科耶夫(Alexandre Kojève)所诠释的黑格尔(Hegel)的见解,即人们追求普遍而平等的"承认"(recognition)。

在福山看来 ,自由民主制承认每个公民的尊严和价值,因而他相信民主制具有道德上的基础。就"历史终结"这一问题,福山认为人类终将"接受世界历史'市场'的判断" ——历史相当于一场不同社会组织形式之间的竞争。当某种政体消除了根本矛盾,人民不再表达极端不满之时,就可以说这种特定的社会组织形式赢得了竞争。在福 山眼中,自由民主制就是历史市场的上的一个胜利者。

随着福山对发展中国家经济和政治模式的深入研究,他逐渐开始从政治 经济学角度思考国家能力对政治体制的影响。2004年出版的《国家构建:21世纪的治理和世界秩序》(State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century) 一书强调了国家能力的重要性,而这一因素传统上常常为研究民主的学者所忽略。随即,福山试图进一步探究国家能力、法治和责任制政府的发展源头,以及这三种 关键制度对政治秩序的影响。在2011年问世的《政治秩序的起源》(The Origins of Political Order) 以及2014年刚刚出版发行的《政治秩序和政治衰败》,福山综合运用哲学和政治经济学手段分析了全球政治发展史。

对于历史上第一个建立现代官僚系统的中国,福山在讨论政治秩序时自然着墨颇多。他结合自己关于政治发展的理论,同笔者探讨了对中国政治未来发展的见解。以下为访谈的前半部分。访谈内容经过编辑和删节,并经过福山本人的审阅。

曹起曈: 如今想来,你觉不觉得你的论点受到了上世纪八十年代末、九十年代初的特殊时期里柏林墙倒塌、苏联解体等一系列历史事件的影响?

福山: 我不这么想。你知道,我最初 的那篇《历史的终结》文章写于柏林墙倒塌之前,所以不如说我是在观察(苏东剧变)发生之前就已然涌动的趋势。其实柏林墙倒塌的速度之快,我也吃了一惊。广 而言之,我认为我们经历了萨缪尔·亨廷顿(Samuel Huntington)所言的"第三波民主化",这一过程始于上世纪七十年代的西班牙、希腊和葡萄牙,其间我们见证了民主国家有35个激增至115个。柏 林墙的倒塌仅仅是这一进程的中点,在此之前,拉丁美洲、欧洲、亚洲等地已经诞生了许多新兴民主政体。

曹起曈: 所以你如何看待自己这些年的见解?在哪些问题上你的观点改变了?在些问题上没有改变?

福山: 有几件事:我觉得现在我更清楚地意识到了许多制度的发展过程是非常偶然而出人意料的。我在撰写《历史的终结》时并未仔细考虑过政治衰败。总的来说,我一开始没有就国家能力这一问题给予足够的重视。我觉得主要区别就是这些。

曹起曈: 你在《历史的终结及最后之人》中引述黑格尔的观点称,人类历史的根本驱动力并不在于经济层面,而在于心理层面——人们为获得"承认"而斗争。这本书中有整整一章都在探讨这种追求"承认"的斗争。你似乎在说,既然"承认"的问题深植于人类心理,这种追求必然具有普世意义,是这样吗?

福山: 我认为任何政治理论都必须是 一种基于人性的理论,因为在某些方面违反人性的政治体制是无法维系的。这是一个复杂的问题。在我看来,共产主义的一个问题在于它对人性的某些方面做了错误 的假设——它假设人类本质上趋向于大型集体而非自己或家人,缺乏真正激励个人的机制。因此,作为一种经济体制,共产主义从未奏效。所以当中国和东欧恢复市 场激励体制时,生产力突然之间即得以扩大,其原因在于,在某种层面上,人的本质是自私的,只愿意为自己工作,而不愿为无法获取个人利益的大型工厂出力。从 这点上看,我认为人性是非常重要的。

当然,人性的另一些方面的确无助于建立一种现代的政治秩序,对于这 一点,我最新的两本书(《政治秩序的起源》及《政治秩序和政治衰败》)谈得很多。人性有趋向朋友与家人的自然倾向,但一个现代的政治体制必须是不带有个人 色彩的——应该基于一个人的优点、技能和(专业)背景选贤举能,而不能仅仅出于亲属关系或利益交换而聘用不称职的人选。

从这种意义上说,我认为所有的现代政治体制都有与人性不相符的地方,因此必须取得适当的平衡——人性的某些方面不能违背,但也不能让人性完全支配体制。

曹起曈: 但有些人可能会说,人性是一个非常主观的概念。的确,演化生物学家和心理学家对人性进行了一些研究,但这些研究通常不能提供充足证据表明,人性存在某种确定的模式。因此,你如何回应那些质疑你关于人性的假设本身是否正确的批评人士?

福山:诚然,"人性究竟为何?" 这一基本问题就某种意义而言是尚未明确的,因为人类可以改变自己的行为,(这种行为模式)极为复杂。所以就这方面而言,文化非常重要,不同的人虽然有相同 的基本生物学属性,但由于成长过程中培养方式等其它因素的不同,其表现也不尽相同。所以显然环境可以塑造人。但我觉得,不同文化下的人类行为仍具有诸多共 同点。我们已经对人脑的生物学属性及对外界事物的反应方式有了很多认识,所以我的确认为,我们现有的经验依据可以支撑"人类普遍享有某些特征"这一说法。

曹起曈: 你刚才提到了文化的重要性,这一点很有趣,因为在《历史的终结》一书中,你对韦伯(Max Weber)所提出的"现代民主制起源于某些地区独有的社会或文化条件"这一论断给予了特别批判……

福山: 这种说法并不尽然。我的意思 是说,我认为自己对文化的见解一直是相同的。文化很重要,某些特定的文化习惯有助于成功民主制的发展。但另一方面,我不觉得文化是完完全全决定性的。此 外,我坚信文化会随着时间而改变。所以诸如"阿拉伯世界无法民主化,因为伊斯兰教出于某些原因天生就反民主",这种论调是未经实践检验的,我并不相信。但 如果说伊斯兰教是否滋生了一些对创立自由民主制不利的障碍?嗯,我觉得很有可能。

曹起曈: 这就引出了一个有趣的问题。许多人声称你对"历史终结"的描述是基于历史决定论的。就我所知,你首次对此予以直接回应是在数年后《历史的终结》再版时的一篇跋文中——你提到自己的观点"只是弱决定论的"。能详细谈一谈吗?你怎么看强决定论和弱决定论之间的差别?

福山: 我认为人类活动的作用和其它 更为宽泛的社会力量都应该纳入考量。因此,我一直坚持的一个论点——当然,这些论点并非由我所创——就是政治形式会随着经济体的发展而变化。所以工业化的 过程创造了资产阶级和无产阶级。同理,人们的教育水平改变之时,其期望要求也相应改变,特别是随着中产阶层的兴起,人们对政治参与的要求几乎总是会提高, 我认为这是一种普世的情况,不随任何人的意志而转移。许多政体都尝试过对压制或阻止这种趋势,但如你所知,他们终归无能为力。

但从另一方面看,这些(社会)力量本身并无法决定社会的形态。我在 最新的一本书(《政治秩序和政治衰败》)指出,意大利和希腊,以及德国和英国都是现代化、工业化的富裕民主国家,但希腊和意大利的腐败和侍从主义 (clientelism)现象远比德国和英国严重。这其中很重要的一点原因在于某些特定的偶发历史事件中不同领袖做出的不同决定。在上世纪九十年代,意 大利历史的关键节点上,贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)恰恰处于领导地位,我认为这是某种重大的悲剧,因为我们可以想见,假使那时是一个更有远见也更为廉洁的领导人执掌政权,意大利原本 将得以彻底转变——而这一切都没有发生。

曹起曈: 所以你也认为历史上的意外和偶发事件也是重要因素……

福山: 对的,完全正确。

曹起曈: 不过《历史的终结》对民主普世性的整体基调还是高度乐观的。你明确反对了当时存在的悲观见解,但的确提到了两种担忧——左派认为,由于巨大的贫富差距,民主无法向所有人提供平等的承认,而右派则基于人们有意追求优势地位的前提,担心平等承认会弱化社会的激励机制。你当时说,来自右派的挑战比来自左派的挑战更为严肃。但从这25年的发展上看,美国和其它发达国家的社会不平等程度显著增长。所以左派的挑战如今似乎比过去紧要了许多?

福山: 我尚不清楚不平等的问题普遍 上将如何解决。当然,人们渴望民主的原因之一在于,如果存在这样一种贫富差距,尤其如果这种贫富差距是由于菁英阶层为一己之利操纵政治体制所导致的,那可 以想见,绝大多数人不会希望这种情况持续下去,会以行使投票权的方式阻止贫富差距扩大和体制顽疾恶化。而这就是上世纪三十年代(美国)的情形,当时的罗斯 福新政和许多福利项目都旨在使得收入趋于平等,如此种种,不一而足。

在此之后,美国就没有再实行过类似的项目,个中原因相当复杂,但我并不觉得这个过程已经完结了。并且我认为,长期而言,民主制的确具有自我纠正的机制,这使得我们可以修正存在的问题,只不过有时候自我纠正的过程缓慢而耗时。

曹起曈: 在同一篇跋文中,你提到了国家能力的重要性。这在当时对于你来说可谓是非常新颖的论点,因为在《历史的终结》的第二章中,你明确列举了强大国家的诸多弊端,将其总结为"强国的弱点"。但随后你反思了之前的想法,用一本书(《国家构建:21世纪的治理和世界秩序》)的篇幅探讨了国家构建的问题。你为什么对衡量国家能力的标准产生了兴趣呢?

福山: 我认为这其实是源于我对发展 中国家所做的所有研究,因为我发现放眼全球,非洲、中东,以及其它地区的国家为何会愈发贫穷,这主要是由于国家能力不足导致的负面效应,它比政治发展中其 它任何成分的缺乏所造成的影响都更严重。而写作《历史的终结》之时,我尚未仔细考虑过这一问题。我是说,在我看来,自己同许多生活在发达国家的人一样,有 时候会把国家能力当做理所当然之事——嗯,对啊,反正国家能力就摆在那里,我们的主要问题是如何对其加以限制。相比之下,我们并没有扪心自问,如何发展国 家能力。

所以如你所知,伊拉克和阿富汗面临着国家崩溃的问题,我们不得不重新建立起新的国家,而这不是一个我们习惯于处理的问题,因为之前我们似乎总是想当然地以为,国家自然而然就是存在的。

曹起曈: 既然你提到了伊拉克问题,你对伊拉克战争的个人态度在这些年里发生了怎样的改变?那场战争有没有影响到你对国家构建这一问题的基本看法?

福山: 嗯,有段时间我不禁开始怀 疑,如果我们在2003年之前就入侵了伊拉克,如今的结果将会怎样。但总之我觉得伊战的情形对我的观点产生了重要影响,因为我认为这场战争是一场重大的错 误,它反映了我们对国家构建的过程知之甚少,也折射出美国的对外政策并不具备有助于在这些地区构建强大国家的手段。

另外,理解我所说的"强大国家"究竟是什么意思,这一点十分重要。 我依然认为,"强国的弱点"是《历史的终结》第二章恰当的标题,因为当你考虑一个像俄罗斯这样的国家时,它的强大在于它具有很强的压迫性,这样的国家有许 多警察,有强大的军队来镇压异议者,如此种种。但与此同时,俄罗斯却无法提供优质的医疗保障,俄罗斯人的寿命预期一直在下降。国家也无法提供高质量的教育 或公共服务,其司法体系也是高度腐败,缺乏公正良好的法律。总而言之,它尽管在压迫能力方面很强大,但就提供基本服务的能力而言,却非常羸弱。所以我认为 这就是一个看似强大,实则有着很多很大程度的弱点的国家,前苏联亦是如此。

曹起曈是独立网站"政见"(CNPolitics)观察员和Stanford in Government (SIG)成员,目前就读于美国斯坦福大学。访谈用英文完成,由曹起曈译为中文。


弗朗西斯·福山:中国精英阶层构成改革阻力(下)

 这是作者今年4月对弗朗西斯·福山(Francis Fukuyama)专访内容的下篇,点击此处阅读上篇。

去年9月,斯坦福大学知名政治学家弗朗西斯·福山的新书《政治秩序和政治衰败》("Political Order and Political Decay")出版发行,随即收获了全球范围的关注。书中指出了美国政体的诸多弊端,警示了"政治衰败"的风险。

对此,各界纷纷发出疑问,上世纪九十年代对自由民主制充满自信的福 山,学术思想是否发生了重大转折,这其中也不乏中国官方媒体的评论——认为福山基于20年的观察,对其理论进行了大幅调整,以至于承认相较于民主和法治而 言,国家能力对繁荣更为重要,而这恰恰契合了中国改革开放以来的高速发展模式。但在笔者去年11月同福山进行的访谈中,他强调,这种解读误解了他的想法。 "我的论点是,一个有效的政治体制必须让国家能力与民主和法治相平衡。"他说,"我认为美国和其他一些民主国家过于强调限制国家权力,以至于把我们逼到了 无法做出艰难抉择的处境。但我觉得中国正相反,国家能力与法治、民主之间仍不够平衡,而这也并非是一种良好的情况。"

在新书中,福山指出,他相信中国的贪腐问题在很大程度上是过于分散 的部门利益所导致的。然而,相较中国而言,美国的治理模式更强调权力的分散。在去年底的访谈中,在回应美国是否同样面临部门利益纠葛的情况时,福山表示, "究竟哪一种体制做得更好需要看哪一种体制能更有效地克服这个问题。如果你想提出赞成威权制度的理由,你可以说,威权政府可以比民主政府更快地转变体制, 远离这些利益纠葛,但这都取决于体制的领导层是否真正愿意行动。而这是我目前不太清楚的地方。"

4月初,福山在其斯坦福大学的办公室再次接受了笔者的采访,我们深 入探讨了不同政治制度的发展趋势。对于历史上第一个建立现代官僚系统的中国,福山在其著作中讨论政治秩序时自然着墨颇多。福山认为,目前一种显著的政治衰 败形式是"家族制的复辟"(repatrimonialization)。现代国家诞生之前,政府官员的选拔不看能力,而看与统治者的关系亲疏。在福山看 来,以官僚系统取代这种家族制的过程标志着政治体制的现代化,但随着政治精英和利益集团的不断强化,如今这一趋势似乎有逆转之势。

在以下的访谈中,他结合自己关于政治发展的理论,探讨了对中国政治未来发展的见解。访谈内容经过编辑和删节,并经过福山本人的审阅。

曹起曈:我注意到你在最近的两本书(《政治秩序的起源》和《政治秩序和政治衰败》)中明显增加了叙述中国的篇幅。这让我想起你曾在斯坦福领导过的治理计划(The Governance Project),旨在对比中美社会治理模式的共同点和差异,以更好地认识和衡量治理这一概念。你是如何萌生出对中美进行比较研究的想法的?

福山:历史上看,现代意义上的官僚体制真正发端于秦 汉时期的中国,那时中国已经具备了相对不带有个人色彩的官员选拔制度(注:汉代的察举制)和官僚规则。但对我而言,还有一个重要而有待考证的问题,诚然, 中国古代的传统与当今的治理体制之间存在某些相似之处,但我认为从实证角度看,我们对中国政府的实际运作方式还知之甚少。比如说,许多人主张中国(比西方 国家)更奉行贤能执政的原则,但我们其实并不完全清楚这一点,因为我们并没有可靠的实证标准来衡量中国官僚系统何种程度上是基于贤能和实力选拔人才的,也 不知道个人关系或者政治上的可靠程度又在其中起了几分作用,后者有时可能比前者对于官员的提拔更为重要。所以我们需要找出某种方法来试图了解这个体制。

此外,中国幅员辽阔,我觉得不同地区、不同级别的政府、不同部门各 自有各自的特点。所以在我看来,我们应该更好地了解这些差异究竟不同在何处。我的意思是,比方说中国很多人都认为,基层政府的腐败非常普遍,相比之下,高 层的情况要好很多。但我并不认为目前有任何证据可以证明这种想法。

曹起曈:就为什么一个社会发展出了如今所具有的政治制度这一问题,你也提出了不少有趣的结论。特别就中国而言,你提到法治从未在中国生根发芽,因为历史上中国从未产生(比国家力量)更主要的宗教力量。但你也同时提到政治制度会逐步演化。那为什么你还关心这些历史传统呢?

福山:我觉得如果从历史的角度看,印度、欧洲和中东 都曾具有基于宗教制度的独立司法分支。就欧洲而言,这种(独立的宗教)制度逐步世俗化,成为了国家的一部分,但却不是行政分支的一部分。所以拥有独立的法 官和司法系统等法律制度具有很深的历史传统。我认为这份历史传统对于欧洲法治至关重要。

但这并不意味着法治只有这一种发展方式。比方说,法治对于商业也很 重要。如果缺乏财产权、仲裁机制、对合同的强制执行以及争议解决措施,就无法创建一个现代经济体,所以就为什么中国需要沿着相同的道路发展法治这一问题而 言,有诸多实用的原因。中国加入世界贸易组织(WTO)的过程中,很大一部分涉及到创建新的法律制度,以允许中国公司同国际公司接触交流,这样的例子还有 很多。所以中国的商法体系也日趋完善。

但在我看来,法律的真正缺乏并不在这一层面,而在党的层面,似乎更高当局并不认为自己必须受到相同法律的约束——他们觉得这些法律是有用的,但自己并不一定要为其制约,他们如果想改变法律以利一己之需,完全可以实现这一点。

依我之见,这一点在涉及权力继承和任期限制方面的规则上将至关重 要。我认为在各威权政体中,中国领导层最为卓越的一点在于存在任期上的限制。中国已经经历了3次每任10年的领导层交替,同时设有大致上强制性的退休年 龄,如此种种。大多数独裁政权都没有这些限制。我的意思是说,卡扎菲支撑了42年,假使他统治10年之后就卸任离职,情况将比现在好很多。所以这对于中国 而言,是一个很大的优势。但问题在于,任期限制并非内嵌于宪制的规定,而只是高层领导人之间的一种默契,因而最终可能无法予以坚持。(注:根据现行中国宪 法第79条,中华人民共和国主席作为中国的虚位元首,任期5年,连任不得超过2届;根据宪法第93条,中华人民共和国中央军事委员会及其主席同样任期5 年,但没有连任限制。此外,中共党章对中共中央总书记和中共中央军事委员会主席皆没有作出连任限制)。

曹起曈你在书中提到,邓小平及其领导层决定引入更多基于规则的程序以避免类似"文化大革命"的悲剧重演。所以这是一个经济层面上很理性的决定……

福山不仅是经济层面上,我认为这个 决定事关领导层的生死存亡。"文化大革命"对中共精英而言极为可怖——他们是"文革"的第一批受害者。所以我认为仅仅出于自我利益,他们也会意识到决策过 程需要引入更多规则。从某种意义上说,法治在很多国家的起源皆出于此,因为统治者最初总是试图尽可能逃避法律的限制,但在某个时刻,他们发现,如果所有人 都遵守规则,而非陷入武断的权力斗争,大家都可以更加安全。

曹起曈:所以你觉得如今中国领导层有同样的利益基础来推动法治吗?

福山嗯,他们是否决心促进法治,我认为这是当前一个很大的问题。我觉得就长期而言,他们应当促进法治的发展,但他们同时也渴望权力,所以这一直都会是一场挣扎。

曹起曈你在书中说"更大程度地坚持中国自身的宪法是一条通向未来改革的明显路径",那你如何评估中国基于自身的宪制体系引入法治的可能性?

福山在党本身接受宪法和宪制规则的 制约之前,中国不会拥有真正的宪制体系。不过我觉得这恰恰是对于中国而言,最为重要的部分,因为我能看见规则和法律的增长,但法律需要直达政治体制的最高 层,哪怕是最有权力的人也要受其制约。而这个过程是可以想像的。十九世纪的欧洲就见证了这样的过程,当时诸如德国的威权政体也具有一定的规则,而随着这些 规则的扩展,人们逐渐持续要求(政府依照规则行事)。

曹起曈你在这两本论政治秩序的书中提到,中国之所以取得了成功,一项主要原因在于其官僚体制具有高度的自主性(autonomy)。那你如何看待官僚自主性在中国未来发展中的作用,特别是其它新兴的社会行动者(social actors)在这一过程中的角色?

福山这是一个复杂的问题,因为自主 性可以是一件好事,也可以是一件坏事,这取决于官僚如何运用自己的自主性。邓小平享有很大的自主性,可以将中国挪向市场体制。这项举措他可以迅速地推行, 比民主国家的领袖迅速得多,因为民主领袖首先必须胜选,取得授权,处理各类法律问题,应对利益群体,诸如此类。我认为,恰恰是由于中国当时没有这些限制, 才使得整个国家迅速完成了市场化转变。

(中国的官僚体制)也涉及许多不同层级的自主性,有制定最终政策的 自主性,也有执行政策的自主性,就后者而言,我觉得中国做得很不错。各个市、县及下级行政区划之间就创新这样的议题展开竞争。基层某种程度上享有很大的自 由,可以进行不同的尝试。此外,更高层级也具有重新制定政策的自主性。当前中国政府试图扩大内需,减少对出口的依赖,这类目标,我认为威权政府可以比民主 政府更迅捷地实现。

但这里存在一个所谓的"坏皇帝"问题。只要是"好皇帝"当政,这种自主性就非常有效,但自从不再有"好皇帝"的那一瞬起,自主性就立刻转变成为一种切实的不利条件。

曹起曈既然你提到了"坏皇帝"的问题,你同时也承认像美国这样的自由民主制在相反的方面也面临着类似的问题——制度可以限制不好的领导人,但一个优秀的领导人,在受到同样制约的情况下,对促进国家的进步却常常无能为力。所以有些人会问,既然如此,中国与其引入民主制,为何不直接着重打造一个更好地贤能统治体系,增强人士组织能力,改善官员提拔系统?

福山嗯,这是一个所有按层级划分的政府所共同面临的问题,一切都取决于最高层。组织部有权提拔它所认为的优秀领导人,但我们又怎么保证它会这么做呢?换言之,谁来监督组织部呢?

所以这就是传统中国政府的问题,这一体制涉及皇帝和官僚机构。官僚理应执行皇帝的命令,但当官僚机构逐渐具有高度自主性后,皇帝就无法控制官僚了。

曹起曈这就是所谓的"委托——代理问题",皇帝"委托"官僚代理执行自身制定的命令,但委托人和代理人的利益倾向并不总是一致的……

福山是的,所以皇帝开始依靠宫内宦 官来监督官僚机构,但他也无法完全相信宦官,所以设立了内正司(注:明代纠察宦官的机构)。高层为了制约下属的权力,不停地堆砌这些监管机构,但这些机构 的运作究竟如何,皇帝却不得而知,于是就产生了信息流通上的问题。我认为如今中国也承受着许多类似的问题——你有政府,之后有党来监督政府,然后有党的 (纪检监察)部门来监督党。这样一来,谁来监管(纪检监察)部门呢?

曹起曈所以习近平一直强调"党要管党"的重要性。你认为长期来看,这一措施会有效吗?

福山就像我之前说的,这似乎取决于最高领导层的情况。我认为其中的一项问题在于,很难永远维系这样一种制度。这是中国政府的经典问题——一代人遇到好皇帝,下一代人遇到坏皇帝。

但我们现在身处一个非常不同的社会和世界。在传统的中国,80%到 90%的人口是农民,以农业为生。整个国家不存在中产阶级,与世界的其它地区也没有太多联系。所以人民可以长期接受那样的政府形式,而实际上这样的治理方 式也催生了饥荒、农民起义和诸多的社会不稳定因素。但我认为如今(想让中国人继续接受这种治理方式)相比过去会艰难得多。在我看来,中国人如今不会心甘情 愿接受一个非常坏的"皇帝"再统治比方说25年,而将其归咎于自己运气太差。

曹起曈说到政治衰败的可能性,你提到美国已演变成一个否决式统治政体(vetocracy)。中国显然不存在这样的问题,因为人们通常没有否决行政决定的权利。既然你提到所有政体都可能遭受政治衰败,你认为中国政治衰败的可能性会是怎样的?

福山我觉得(中美两国)政治衰败的源头可能会存在些许不同。我是说,中国的问题不在于有太多的否决,而在于否决的数量不够。中国的体制需要更多分权和制衡,而美国需要更少的分权和制衡。

但我认为中国的问题在于精英阶层。中国的经济和政治体制存在太多的纠葛——国有企业、政府部门,许多非常适应当前体制的强大社会行动者。他们会经常对经济增长和政治改革等进步造成阻碍。所以我觉得这是中国政治衰败的一个潜在来源。

曹起曈你在书中介绍了"家族制复辟"这一概念作为政治衰败的一种主要形式。有论者表示,如果2016年美国的总统大选,两党参选人分别来自布什和克林顿家族,或者说如果中国将由更多所谓的"太子党"或红二代统治,你认为这两种情况都可被同样归类为家族制的复辟吗?

福山呃,我不认为(美国的问题)是家族制复辟最重要的形式。政治家的子女或家人竞选公职,在我看来并不是什么严重问题。想反,我认为更大的问题在于强大的利益集团得以支配国家,利用政府实现自己的目的。我觉得这才是需要注意的问题。

曹起曈所以你是否觉得中国的国有企业或者庞大的政府部门将成为家族制复辟意义上的新兴社会行动者?他们是否可能损害官僚体系的自主性?

福山我们只能静观后效了。目前尚不明确党是否有能力对此加以控制。中国有很多可能阻碍改革进程的力量来源。精英得以逐步扩张自己的力量和影响力,这是一个普遍存在的政治问题。要想限制这种势头,唯有依靠深思熟虑的措施。

曹起曈最后,我们上次的采访中,你提到说你并不清楚接下来要做什么?现在你更清楚了吗?

福山啊,我还在考虑。目前我没有任何宏大的写作计划。

曹起曈那你是否觉得你将来的考虑会基于世界今后的发展呢?

福山我还不知道。有些我很感兴趣的问题可能跟现在报纸头条上的消息没有什么联系。

曹起曈所以,又是更集中于理论方面?

福山嗯嗯。

曹起曈是独立网站"政见"(CNPolitics)观察员和Stanford in Government (SIG)成员,目前就读于美国斯坦福大学。访谈用英文完成,由曹起曈译为中文。

Francis Fukuyama's 'Political Order and Political Decay'

By SHERI BERMANSEPT. 11, 2014

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama published an essay in The National Interest entitled "The End of History?" that thrust him into the center of public debate. Although often misunderstood and maligned, its central argument was straightforward and sensible: With the collapse of Communism, liberal democracy stood alone as the only form of government compatible with socio­-economic modernity. Over the years since, Fukuyama has continued to argue the case, and has now summed up his efforts with a two-­volume magnum opus that chronicles global political development from prehistory to the present. A quarter-century on, he remains convinced that no other political system is viable in the long run, but concludes his survey with a sobering twist: Liberal democracy's future is cloudy, but that is because of its own internal problems, not competition from any external opponent.

Fukuyama began the first volume, "The Origins of Political Order," which appeared in 2011, by stating that the challenge for contemporary developing countries was how to "get to Denmark" — that is, how to build prosperous, well-governed, liberal democracies. This, in turn, required understanding what "Denmark" — liberal democracy — actually involved. Drawing on the insights of his mentor Samuel Huntington, Fukuyama argued that political order was all about institutions, and that liberal democracy in particular rested on a delicate balance of three distinct features — political accountability; a strong, effective state; and the rule of law. Accountability required mechanisms for making leaders responsive to their publics, which meant regular free and fair multiparty elections. But elections alone were not enough: A true liberal democracy needed to have its institutions of accountability supplemented by a central government that could get things done and by rules and regulations that applied equally to ­everyone.

Photo Francis Fukuyama

Fukuyama showed how throughout human history these three factors had often emerged independently or in various combinations. China, for example, developed a state long before any existed in Europe, yet did not acquire either the rule of law or political accountability. India and much of the Muslim world, by contrast, developed something like the rule of law early on, but not strong states (or, in much of the Muslim world, political accountability). It was only in parts of Europe in the late 18th century, Fukuyama noted, that all three aspects started to come together simultaneously.

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"Political Order and Political Decay" picks up the story at this point, taking the reader on a whirlwind tour of modern development from the French Revolution to the present. Fukuyama is nothing if not ambitious. He wants to do more than just describe what liberal democracy is; he wants to discover how and why it develops (or does not). So in this volume, as in the previous one, he covers a vast amount of ground, summarizing an extraordinary amount of research and putting forward a welter of arguments on an astonishing range of topics. Inevitably, some of these arguments are more convincing than others. And few hard generalizations or magic formulas emerge, since Fukuyama is too knowledgeable to force history into a Procrustean bed.

Thus he suggests that military competition can push states to modernize, citing ancient China and, more recently, Japan and Prussia. But he also notes many cases where military competition had no positive effect on state building (19th-century Latin America) and many where it had a negative effect (Papua New Guinea, as well as other parts of Melanesia). And he suggests that the sequencing of political development is important, arguing that "those countries in which democracy preceded modern state building have had much greater problems achieving high-quality governance than those that inherited modern states from absolutist times." But the cases he gives as examples do not necessarily fit the argument well (since Prussia's state eventually had trouble deferring to civilian authorities and the early weakness of the Italian state was probably caused more by a lack of democracy than a surfeit of it). In addition, he surely understands that authoritarianism is even more likely to generate state weakness than democracy since without free media, an active civil society and regular elections, authoritarianism has more opportunities to make use of corruption, clientelism and predation than democracies do.

Perhaps Fukuyama's most interesting section is his discussion of the United States, which is used to illustrate the interaction of democracy and state building. Up through the 19th century, he notes, the United States had a weak, corrupt and patrimonial state. From the end of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century, however, the American state was transformed into a strong and effective independent actor, first by the Progressives and then by the New Deal. This change was driven by "a social revolution brought about by industrialization, which mobilized a host of new political actors with no interest in the old clientelist system." The American example shows that democracies can indeed build strong states, but that doing so, Fukuyama argues, requires a lot of effort over a long time by powerful players not tied to the older order.

Yet if the United States illustrates how democratic states can develop, it also illustrates how they can decline. Drawing on Huntington again, Fukuyama reminds us that "all political systems — past and present — are liable to decay," as older institutional structures fail to evolve to meet the needs of a changing world. "The fact that a system once was a successful and stable liberal democracy does not mean that it will remain so in perpetuity," and he warns that even the United States has no permanent immunity from institutional decline.

Over the past few decades, American political development has gone into reverse, Fukuyama says, as its state has become weaker, less efficient and more corrupt. One cause is growing economic inequality and concentration of wealth, which has allowed elites to purchase immense political power and manipulate the system to further their own interests. Another cause is the permeability of American political institutions to interest groups, allowing an array of factions that "are collectively unrepresentative of the public as a whole" to exercise disproportionate influence on government. The result is a vicious cycle in which the American state deals poorly with major challenges, which reinforces the public's distrust of the state, which leads to the state's being starved of resources and authority, which leads to even poorer performance.

Where this cycle leads even the vastly knowledgeable Fukuyama can't predict, but suffice to say it is nowhere good. And he fears that America's problems may increasingly come to characterize other liberal democracies as well, including those of Europe, where "the growth of the European Union and the shift of policy making away from national capitals to Brussels" has made "the European system as a whole . . . resemble that of the United States to an increasing degree."

Fukuyama's readers are thus left with a depressing paradox. Liberal democracy remains the best system for dealing with the challenges of modernity, and there is little reason to believe that Chinese, Russian or Islamist alternatives can provide the diverse range of economic, social and political goods that all humans crave. But unless liberal democracies can somehow manage to reform themselves and combat institutional decay, history will end not with a bang but with a resounding whimper.

POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY

From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy

By Francis Fukuyama

Illustrated. 658 pp. Farrar, Straus & Giroux. $35.

Sheri Berman teaches political science at Barnard College, Columbia University.

A version of this review appears in print on September 14, 2014, on page BR1 of the Sunday Book Review with the headline: 'Political Order and Political Decay'.