新冠病毒危機中，中國媒體和公民發聲的力量
上個月，在北京的記者。 KYODO, VIA ASSOCIATED PRESS冠狀病毒的暴發讓國際社會再一次審視中國的政治制度。一些評論者對中國共產黨應對危機的效率表示讚賞，但大多數人都在抨擊中共的弱點。一些人甚至將此次疫情歸咎於中共，稱其為「共產黨的冠狀病毒」或「一帶一路大流行病」。
中國再一次在很大程度上被描述為鐵板一塊的龐然大物，而黨似乎行使著近乎完全的控制，用一名專欄作家的話說，中共「熄滅了幾乎所有的自由和監督的希望」。但是，中共的權威不是絕對的。讓人認為它也許有絕對的權力，是在模糊儘管政府收緊了限制，中國社會多年來仍設法維持的活力。
冠狀病毒危機中出現的有希望的事情之一是，中國更敢說話的信息管道和社群媒體上的新聲音產生的創造性報導。為了刻畫這個複雜的故事，記者和活躍人士表現出令人印象深刻的動員能力，有時還挑戰當局對疫情的處理。
到目前為止已發表的幾十篇文章涉及範圍廣泛，從關於武漢（這個有1100萬人口的城市是新冠病毒暴發的中心，自1月23日起封城）的醫生、患者和居民的困境等人情味故事，到關於醫療資源短缺、刻意掩蓋信息，以及中國紅十字會的腐敗等更具調查性的報導。
財新傳媒下屬的中國最受尊重的商業雜誌之一《財新週刊》最近發表了一篇直言不諱的調查報導，它由37名記者撰寫，分為四個部分。第一個部分一步步地講述武漢市政府遲遲不披露危機嚴重程度，讀起來既像驚險小說，又像科學分析。這篇文章展示了地方當局通過威脅「吹哨人」醫生、讓他們噤聲，淡化疾病暴發的波及範圍，隱瞞病毒可以在人之間傳播的事實，從而將疫情掩蓋了近一個月。根據對學者、醫生、病人和官員的採訪，這篇報導表明，人際傳播在暴發的早期就已經很明顯，與武漢市官員的說法相矛盾，官員稱，感染僅限於那些去過某個藏污納垢的海鮮和活動物市場的人。
除了《財新》以及另一個以調查能力著稱的雜誌《財經》之外，其他頗受尊重的媒體，包括《新京報》、《北京青年報》深度報導部「北青深一度」和《中國青年報》，甚至中國版《GQ》、《人物》和《三聯生活週刊》等時尚雜誌，都對冠狀病毒危機做了深入報導。
但這些媒體是如何突破政府對信息的控制的呢？
首先，政府的控制並不完整，有些報導被審查漏掉，至少暫時漏掉。中國的政策制定比表面看起來的更為四分五裂，執行上經常出現漏洞，尤其是中央政府和地方政府之間。這些縫隙是地方官員有時能夠掩蓋他們的過錯、不讓北京知道的原因之一。但這些縫隙也為批評性報導創造了機會。
地方官員只能直接監管在本省註冊的媒體；他們對總部設在其他地方的新聞機構做的事幾乎沒有發言權。因此，才有了可被稱為異地調查的做法~~這是中國新聞業一個長久以來的特徵。大多數關於冠狀病毒疫情的深度報導，都是由總部設在湖北省（武漢是它的省會所在地）以外的新聞媒體報導的。
中央政府也在危難關頭故意留給媒體一些有限的空間，讓它們來揭開失敗的蓋子。暫時的信息開放對政府有幫助：信息可以幫助政府找到問題的根源，把握公眾的情緒，也可能讓政府做出有效的回應，或者至少讓政府展現出一種受監管的透明度的形象。
可以預見的是，危難過後，批評的聲音能否持久取決於這些媒體精心準備報導策略的能力。正如關於2008年汶川地震的報導，以及我花了數年時間分析的礦難報導，目前對新冠病毒疫情的報導也是傾向於間接地暗示找問題。一種常見的方法是，把批評藏在關於個人苦難的富有人情味的故事裡。對被死於病毒性肺炎的患者家屬暴打的一名醫生的感人採訪，沒有具體指責任何人；它只是揭示出基層危機管理的混亂和絕望。然而，在對人間悲劇的真實描述背後，似乎隱藏著一個不言而喻的政治信息：如果醫生的安全得不到保障的話，他們怎麼能~~我們怎麼能~~與病毒作鬥爭呢？
另一種方法是，記者大量引用專家的評論。在一定程度上，這讓記者可以把自己與他們所傳達的反對意見隔離開。考慮到中國社會對學者的高度尊重，把批評用知名專家的意見表述出來，既提高了批評的水平，也使其聽起來更易接受。
《財新》有一篇報導幾乎完全依賴專家的說法，暗示武漢官員推遲了發布有關疫情的重要信息~~儘管他們的官方義務有含糊不清的地方，但推遲的做法是錯誤的。這篇文章基本上是一份追究地方當局法律責任的案件梗概，但讀起來並不給人這種印象。報導以兩位北京教授的呼籲結束，他們建議修改現行法律，以防止未來發生類似的不幸。學者們用提出解決方案的方式說話，似乎不是在譴責，而是提供建設性的反饋。（至少一開始是這樣：這篇報導後來被屏蔽了。）
就目前而言，冠狀病毒危機的責任~~就像以前其他的危機一樣~~主要落在地方官員的肩上。將矛頭指向中央政府是更微妙的問題：首先，這可能很快引發審查和其他懲罰；第二個原因是，一般來說，越接近權力的上層，追究責任就越困難。西方記者會立刻批評中國整個政治體系的所有缺陷，但中國記者則傾向於避免籠統的評判，而是關注具體的犯錯誤者。
《財新》最近的一篇文章報導稱，湖北衛生部門直到國家疾病預防控制中心至少在內部提高了疫情的威脅級別大約10天後才將疫情公開。這篇文章並沒有指出誰應該對此負責，而是讓讀者自行判斷，這究竟是一個關於地方政府掩蓋情況的故事，還是一個國家官僚機構效率低下的故事。
由於社群媒體在傳播（有時是洩漏）信息方面起著更有力的作用，中國的批評性新聞也出現了激增。最先對這種可疑疾病發出警告的武漢的醫生們，是用微信群來傳播他們的擔憂的。他們的信息隨後被鳳凰衛視網站轉載並加以分析，財新和其他媒體也寫了這些「吹哨人」醫生的故事。武漢的醫院人滿為患的可怕狀況，以及引人注目的屍袋片段被公民記者、護士和病人記錄了下來。社群媒體平台上流傳著一些超現實的畫面，比如武漢空蕩蕩的街道，人們舉著橫幅阻止武漢居民進入他們城鎮的照片，有一個地方甚至把道挖斷，使其無法通行。
也許可以說，冠狀病毒疫情是中國首次「直播」的重大災難，是參與者用自己的智慧型手機做的「直播」。
社群媒體已不僅僅是信息的載體，它近年來還催生了更多的新聞報導和更多的不同聲音。對冠狀病毒危機的一些深入報導來自非傳統的、只在網上發表的新聞網站，比如騰訊和搜狐，這些網站沒有做獨立報導的官方許可；還有所謂的自媒體，這些自行運營的社群媒體帳戶製作的內容從娛樂到政治評論無所不有。這些平台中有一些已在盈利，由前記者運營，以公民新聞為特色。
但危難關頭的批評性報導的窗口往往相當窄，它的開啟和關閉也不可預測。這在一定程度上是因為官員實行的是我在其他地方所說的所謂「謹慎的即興之作」：他們的最終目的是社會穩定，當局試圖在政治控制與精心策劃的透明度之間尋找脆弱的平衡，在審查、宣傳與允許媒體（或其替代物）要求追究責任之間搖擺。
例如，我發現，政府只允許了數週對2008年四川汶川地震進行調查報導，那次地震導致逾6.9萬人死亡。關於校舍質量差導致了死亡人數多的報導出來之後，政府阻止了對這場災難的獨立調查。
一旦一場危機看來可能會導致社會不穩定~~尤其是當公眾的指責似乎從地方轉向中央政府時，政府就開始控制媒體，並試圖利用它來傳遞一個統一的官方信息。就連民族主義報紙《環球時報》的總編輯胡錫進也批評了武漢政府在冠狀病毒暴發的初期讓吹哨人噤聲的做法。另一方面，一些關於新冠病毒的批評報導——雖然不一定是最嚴厲的，也已經從互聯網上消失了。
很難說中國記者和關心此事的公民還能對這場危機進行多久的報導、提出多少尖銳問題。但值得記住的是，威權主義也是創造力之母。中國引導、壓制或控制媒體的努力，已經產生了一些巧妙地、間接地避開了限制的非傳統新聞來源。當局在一定程度上容忍到了這些來源。即使是在國家主席習近平的領導下，政府對來自人民的自下而上的壓力~~他們需要了解真相以及對問責的要求——仍然敏感，並會做出某種響應。正如冠狀病毒疫情所揭示的那樣，在中國，公眾與黨國之間也存在著一種社會契約。
Maria Repnikova (@MariaRepnikova) 是喬治亞州立大學(Georgia State University)國際傳播學助理教授，著有《中國的媒體政治：威權下的即興力量》(「Media Politics in China: Improvising Power Under Authoritarianism」)。
翻譯：Cindy Hao
新冠病毒危機中，中國媒體和公民發聲的力量
The Subtle Muckrakers of the Coronavirus Epidemic
上個月，在北京的記者。 KYODO, VIA ASSOCIATED PRESSThe outbreak of the coronavirus has brought international scrutiny down on China's political system. Again. A few commentators have applauded the efficiency of the Chinese Communist Party's response, but most have zoomed in on its weaknesses. Some have even blamed the party itself for the outbreak, calling the disease a "Communist coronavirus" or "the Belt and Road Pandemic."
Once again, China is largely being depicted as a monolith, and the party as though it exercises near-complete control, "crushing almost every wisp of freedom and oversight," according to one columnist. But the party's authority isn't absolute. And to suggest that it might be is to obscure the dynamism that Chinese society has managed to preserve over the years despite the government's tightening restrictions.
中國再一次在很大程度上被描述為鐵板一塊的龐然大物，而黨似乎行使著近乎完全的控制，用一名專欄作家的話說，中共「熄滅了幾乎所有的自由和監督的希望」。但是，中共的權威不是絕對的。讓人認為它也許有絕對的權力，是在模糊儘管政府收緊了限制，中國社會多年來仍設法維持的活力。
One of the hopeful things to have emerged from the coronavirus crisis is the creative coverage produced by China's more outspoken information outlets and new voices on social media. Journalists and activists have demonstrated an impressive ability to mobilize in order to capture this complex story and, at times, challenge the authorities' handling of the epidemic.
冠狀病毒危機中出現的有希望的事情之一是，中國更敢說話的信息管道和社群媒體上的新聲音產生的創造性報導。為了刻畫這個複雜的故事，記者和活躍人士表現出令人印象深刻的動員能力，有時還挑戰當局對疫情的處理。
The dozens of articles published so far range from human-interest narratives about the plight of doctors, victims and residents in Wuhan — the city of 11 million at the center of the epidemic, which has been under lockdown since Jan. 23 — to more investigative stories about shortages of medical resources, deliberate information cover-ups and corruption at China's Red Cross.
到目前為止已發表的幾十篇文章涉及範圍廣泛，從關於武漢（這個有1100萬人口的城市是新冠病毒暴發的中心，自1月23日起封城）的醫生、患者和居民的困境等人情味故事，到關於醫療資源短缺、刻意掩蓋信息，以及中國紅十字會的腐敗等更具調查性的報導。
Caixin, a news group that owns one of China's most respected business magazines, recently published an especially hard-hitting investigation, a four-part series produced by three dozen journalists. The first of those stories, a step-by-step account of the Wuhan government's delays in revealing the extent of the unfolding crisis, reads like it's part thriller, part scientific analysis. The article shows how the local authorities enabled a cover-up that lasted nearly a month by threatening or silencing whistle-blower doctors, downplaying the epidemic's reach and concealing the fact that the virus could be transmitted between people. Drawing on interviews with scholars, doctors, patients and officials, the report demonstrates that human-to-human transmission was evident early on, contradicting the claim by city officials that infections were limited to people who had visited an insalubrious seafood and live-animal market.
Beyond Caixin — and Caijing, another magazine with a reputation for investigative prowess — other well-respected media outlets, including Xinjing Bao (Beijing News), Beijing Qingnian Bao Shenyidu (Beijing Youth Daily's investigative reporting unit) and Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth Daily), and even lifestyle magazines like GQ China, Renwu (Portrait Magazine) and Sanlian Zhoukan (Lifeweek Magazine) have provided in-depth coverage of the coronavirus crisis.
But how have these outlets managed to break through the government's control over information?
但這些媒體是如何突破政府對信息的控制的呢？
For one thing, that control is incomplete, and some stories slip through, at least temporarily. Policymaking in China is more fragmented than it might seem from the outside, with frequent gaps in implementation, especially between central and local authorities. Those cracks are one reason local officials can sometimes cover up their failings to hide them from Beijing. But they also create openings for critical reporting.
首先，政府的控制並不完整，有些報導被審查漏掉，至少暫時漏掉。中國的政策制定比表面看起來的更為四分五裂，執行上經常出現漏洞，尤其是中央政府和地方政府之間。這些縫隙是地方官員有時能夠掩蓋他們的過錯、不讓北京知道的原因之一。但這些縫隙也為批評性報導創造了機會。
Local officials can only directly supervise the media outlets registered in their own provinces; they have little say over the doings of news outlets based elsewhere. Hence what could be called the practice of "extraterritorial" investigations — a longstanding feature of Chinese journalism. Most in-depth reports about the coronavirus epidemic have been carried by news outlets based outside Hubei Province, where Wuhan is located.
地方官員只能直接監管在本省註冊的媒體；他們對總部設在其他地方的新聞機構做的事幾乎沒有發言權。因此，才有了可被稱為異地調查的做法~~這是中國新聞業一個長久以來的特徵。大多數關於冠狀病毒疫情的深度報導，都是由總部設在湖北省（武漢是它的省會所在地）以外的新聞媒體報導的。
In times of crisis, the central authorities in Beijing have also deliberately granted the media limited space to uncover any failures. Temporary information openings are useful to the government: They can help it identify the sources of a problem, assess public sentiment and possibly, too, deliver an effective response — or at the very least, allow it to project an image of managed transparency.
中央政府也在危難關頭故意留給媒體一些有限的空間，讓它們來揭開失敗的蓋子。暫時的信息開放對政府有幫助：信息可以幫助政府找到問題的根源，把握公眾的情緒，也可能讓政府做出有效的回應，或者至少讓政府展現出一種受監管的透明度的形象。
And then, predictably, the persistence of critical voices depends on their ability to carefully craft their reporting strategies. The current coverage of the epidemic — much like articles about the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake and coal mining disasters that I have analyzed over the years — tends to imply faultfinding indirectly. One popular approach is to veil criticism in human-interest stories about individual suffering. A moving interview with a doctor brutally attacked by a relative of a patient who died of viral pneumonia places no blame on anyone in particular; it simply reveals chaos and despair at the grass-roots level of crisis management. And yet behind the raw depiction of human tragedy seems to lie a tacit political message: If doctors cannot be kept safe, how then can they, how can we, fight the virus?
可以預見的是，危難過後，批評的聲音能否持久取決於這些媒體精心準備報導策略的能力。正如關於2008年汶川地震的報導，以及我花了數年時間分析的礦難報導，目前對新冠病毒疫情的報導也是傾向於間接地暗示找問題。一種常見的方法是，把批評藏在關於個人苦難的富有人情味的故事裡。對被死於病毒性肺炎的患者家屬暴打的一名醫生的感人採訪，沒有具體指責任何人；它只是揭示出基層危機管理的混亂和絕望。然而，在對人間悲劇的真實描述背後，似乎隱藏著一個不言而喻的政治信息：如果醫生的安全得不到保障的話，他們怎麼能~~我們怎麼能~~與病毒作鬥爭呢？
Another approach is for reporters to draw heavily on expert commentary. This insulates them somewhat from any disapproval they are relaying. And given the high respect for scholars in Chinese society, presenting any criticism as the view of established experts also elevates and legitimizes it.
另一種方法是，記者大量引用專家的評論。在一定程度上，這讓記者可以把自己與他們所傳達的反對意見隔離開。考慮到中國社會對學者的高度尊重，把批評用知名專家的意見表述出來，既提高了批評的水平，也使其聽起來更易接受。
One Caixin report relied almost exclusively on experts to suggest that Wuhan officials had delayed releasing essential information about the outbreak — and improperly so, despite ambiguity about their formal obligations. The article was, essentially, the sketch of a legal case against the local authorities, and yet it managed to not come across as that. It concluded with a plea from two Beijing professors recommending that current laws be amended to prevent similar mishaps in the future. Cast as proposing solutions, the scholars appeared to be not condemning but offering constructive feedback. (At least at first: The report has since been blocked.)
《財新》有一篇報導幾乎完全依賴專家的說法，暗示武漢官員推遲了發布有關疫情的重要信息~~儘管他們的官方義務有含糊不清的地方，但推遲的做法是錯誤的。這篇文章基本上是一份追究地方當局法律責任的案件梗概，但讀起來並不給人這種印象。報導以兩位北京教授的呼籲結束，他們建議修改現行法律，以防止未來發生類似的不幸。學者們用提出解決方案的方式說話，似乎不是在譴責，而是提供建設性的反饋。（至少一開始是這樣：這篇報導後來被屏蔽了。）
For now, responsibility for the coronavirus crisis — as for other crises past — is being placed primarily on the shoulders of local officials. Pointing a finger at the central government is far more delicate: one, because that can quickly result in censorship and other punishment; two, because it usually is more difficult to establish blame higher up the ladder of authority. Western journalists are quick to criticize the whole of China's political system for any of its shortcomings, but Chinese reporters tend to steer clear of sweeping judgments, focusing on specific culprits instead.
就目前而言，冠狀病毒危機的責任~~就像以前其他的危機一樣~~主要落在地方官員的肩上。將矛頭指向中央政府是更微妙的問題：首先，這可能很快引發審查和其他懲罰；第二個原因是，一般來說，越接近權力的上層，追究責任就越困難。西方記者會立刻批評中國整個政治體系的所有缺陷，但中國記者則傾向於避免籠統的評判，而是關注具體的犯錯誤者。
A recent Caixin article reported that the Hubei health authorities did not publicly raise the threat level of the outbreak until about 10 days after the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention had, at least internally. The piece doesn't assign blame, leaving it to readers to decide whether this is the story of a local cover-up or national bureaucratic inefficiency.
《財新》最近的一篇文章報導稱，湖北衛生部門直到國家疾病預防控制中心至少在內部提高了疫情的威脅級別大約10天後才將疫情公開。這篇文章並沒有指出誰應該對此負責，而是讓讀者自行判斷，這究竟是一個關於地方政府掩蓋情況的故事，還是一個國家官僚機構效率低下的故事。
Critical journalism in China has also spiked thanks to the more forceful role of social media in spreading, sometimes leaking, information. The Wuhan doctors who first warned about the suspicious illness used WeChat groups to disseminate their concerns. Their messages were later reposted and analyzed on the website of Phoenix TV and profiled in Caixin, among other outlets. The gruesome conditions at overcrowded hospitals and dramatic footage of body bags in Wuhan were recorded by citizen-journalists, nurses and patients. Social-media platforms relayed the surreal images of the city's eerily empty streets and shots of people with banners blocking Wuhan residents from entering their towns — in one case even digging up the road to make it impassable.
由於社群媒體在傳播（有時是洩漏）信息方面起著更有力的作用，中國的批評性新聞也出現了激增。最先對這種可疑疾病發出警告的武漢的醫生們，是用微信群來傳播他們的擔憂的。他們的信息隨後被鳳凰衛視網站轉載並加以分析，財新和其他媒體也寫了這些「吹哨人」醫生的故事。武漢的醫院人滿為患的可怕狀況，以及引人注目的屍袋片段被公民記者、護士和病人記錄了下來。社群媒體平台上流傳著一些超現實的畫面，比如武漢空蕩蕩的街道，人們舉著橫幅阻止武漢居民進入他們城鎮的照片，有一個地方甚至把道挖斷，使其無法通行。
One could say that the coronavirus epidemic is the first major disaster in China to be "televised" — via smartphones by the participants themselves.
也許可以說，冠狀病毒疫情是中國首次「直播」的重大災難，是參與者用自己的智慧型手機做的「直播」。
And social media has been more than a vehicle for information: It has also spawned more journalism and a greater variety of voices in recent years. Some of the deeper coverage of the coronavirus crisis has come from nontraditional, online-only news sites, like Tengxun and Sohu, which officially aren't allowed to carry out independent reporting, and so-called self-media ("zi meiti" in Chinese), self-operated social-media accounts that produce anything from entertainment to political commentary. Some of these platforms are now profitable, run by former journalists, and feature citizen journalism.
社群媒體已不僅僅是信息的載體，它近年來還催生了更多的新聞報導和更多的不同聲音。對冠狀病毒危機的一些深入報導來自非傳統的、只在網上發表的新聞網站，比如騰訊和搜狐，這些網站沒有做獨立報導的官方許可；還有所謂的自媒體，這些自行運營的社群媒體帳戶製作的內容從娛樂到政治評論無所不有。這些平台中有一些已在盈利，由前記者運營，以公民新聞為特色。
But the window for critical reporting in times of crises tends to be quite narrow, and it opens and shuts rather unpredictably. This is partly because officials practice what I have described elsewhere as "guarded improvisation": With social stability as their ultimate aim, the authorities try to strike a fragile balance between political control and curated transparency, alternating between censorship or propaganda and allowing the media, or its surrogates, to press for accountability.
但危難關頭的批評性報導的窗口往往相當窄，它的開啟和關閉也不可預測。這在一定程度上是因為官員實行的是我在其他地方所說的所謂「謹慎的即興之作」：他們的最終目的是社會穩定，當局試圖在政治控制與精心策劃的透明度之間尋找脆弱的平衡，在審查、宣傳與允許媒體（或其替代物）要求追究責任之間搖擺。
I found, for example, that news investigations into the earthquake in Wenchuan, Sichuan Province, in 2008 — more than 69,000 dead — were allowed only for a few weeks. After accounts revealed that poorly built schools had contributed to the death toll, the government blocked independent inquiries into the disaster.
例如，我發現，政府只允許了數週對2008年四川汶川地震進行調查報導，那次地震導致逾6.9萬人死亡。關於校舍質量差導致了死亡人數多的報導出來之後，政府阻止了對這場災難的獨立調查。
Once a crisis seems like it could cause social instability — especially when public blame appears to shift from the local to the central authorities — the government starts reining in the media and tries to co-opt it into delivering a unified, official message. Even Hu Xijin, the editor of the nationalistic Global Times, has called out the Wuhan government for silencing whistle-blowers in the early days of the coronavirus outbreak. On the other hand, some critical articles about the epidemic — though not necessarily the hardest-hitting ones — have already vanished from the internet.
一旦一場危機看來可能會導致社會不穩定~~尤其是當公眾的指責似乎從地方轉向中央政府時，政府就開始控制媒體，並試圖利用它來傳遞一個統一的官方信息。就連民族主義報紙《環球時報》的總編輯胡錫進也批評了武漢政府在冠狀病毒暴發的初期讓吹哨人噤聲的做法。另一方面，一些關於新冠病毒的批評報導~~雖然不一定是最嚴厲的，也已經從互聯網上消失了。
There is no telling how much longer Chinese journalists and concerned citizens will be able to report on and raise hard questions about the crisis. But it's worth remembering that authoritarianism also is the mother of creativity. China's efforts to steer, muffle or control the media have produced alternative news sources that subtly, indirectly skirt restrictions. And this, the authorities tolerate, to a point. Even under President Xi Jinping, the government is sensitive and somewhat responsive to bottom-up pressure from the people — their need to know, their calls for accountability. In China, too, as the coronavirus epidemic reveals, there is a social contract between the public and the party-state.
很難說中國記者和關心此事的公民還能對這場危機進行多久的報導、提出多少尖銳問題。但值得記住的是，威權主義也是創造力之母。中國引導、壓制或控制媒體的努力，已經產生了一些巧妙地、間接地避開了限制的非傳統新聞來源。當局在一定程度上容忍到了這些來源。即使是在國家主席習近平的領導下，政府對來自人民的自下而上的壓力~~他們需要了解真相以及對問責的要求~~仍然敏感，並會做出某種響應。正如冠狀病毒疫情所揭示的那樣，在中國，公眾與黨國之間也存在著一種社會契約。
No comments:
Post a Comment